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21 OCTOBER 1986

# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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21 OCTOBER 1986

CHINA REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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GENERAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FUZHOU HOLDS INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA MEETING

OW110519 Fuzhou Fujian Provincial Service in Mandarin 1030 GMT 6 Sep 86

[Text] The third national work meeting on televised reports for foreign countries concluded in Fuzhou on 6 September. The meeting, which opened on 1 September, reviewed and summed up the experience of international propaganda work through television over the past 2 years and proposed specific measures to improve and strengthen the work in view of the current realities. The meeting called for radio and television departments at all levels to strengthen leadership; attach great importance to international propaganda work through television; strengthen both domestic and international propaganda work; accelerate the training of specialized personnel in the field; unify planning and coordination; highlight the theme of each program; and promote information feedback. The meeting also called for improving program quality so that international propaganda through television can play a still better role in safeguarding world peace, reunifying the motherland, and promoting socialist modernization.

During the meeting, Yu Wen, deputy head of the International Propaganda Group of the CPC Central Committee, and Xie Wenqing, vice minister of Radio, Cinema, and Television, separately made reports. The meeting issued certificates of merit to units that produced outstanding television programs for foreign consumers in 1985.

/12858

CSO: 4005/007

## BRIEFS

SOVIET SPOKESMAN ON DANILOFF CASE--Moscow, September 9 (XINHUA)--Washington should not make U.S.-Soviet ties the hostage of a relatively trivial incident like the Danilooff spy case, Soviet Government spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said today. Speaking at a press conference, Gerasimov hinted that Nicholas Danilooff, a Moscow-based American journalist arrested by Soviet police on spy charges, might be released if both countries take appropriate action. If the two countries work hard, a solution could be found on the basis of "reciprocity", Gerasimov said, without elaborating. The spokesman expressed the hope that the arrest of Danilooff will not hamper bilateral relations. Should someone in Washington want to cut U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange programs to punish the Soviet Union for holding Danilooff, they might then move to torpedo overall relations with the Soviet Union, Gerasimov said. Gerasimov was referring to speculation in Washington that punitive measures will be taken against Moscow if Danilooff is not released. [Excerpts] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0104 GMT 10 Sep 86 OW] /6662

UN UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL ON DISARMAMENT--Beijing, September 12 (XINHUA)--Jan Martenson, under secretary general for disarmament affairs of the United Nations, spoke to a Chinese audience here today on the world situation in disarmament and the U.N. efforts for promoting disarmament and ending the arms race in recent years. Martenson spoke highly of China's efforts in reducing its troops and turning its military facilities to civilian use. Martenson is here as guest of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0941 GMT 12 Sep 86 OW] /6662

CSO: 4000/010

## PRC PAPER VIEWS USSR WRITER'S CONGRESS

HK110453 Beijing WENYI BAO in Chinese 2 Aug 86 p 1

[Commentary by contributing reporter Zhang Jie [1728 2212]: "A Grand Meeting in a 'Turning Stage'--roundup of the Eighth Congress of Soviet Writers"]

[Text] The USSR Union of Writers with nearly 10,000 members held its Eighth Congress in late June. The recent meeting was convened at a time when a 'turning point' of reform in all fields of Soviet social life has begun. Therefore, how literature should fit into the new situation of reform, and how it should make contributions to reform became the theme of the meeting.

Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, met some of the writers on the eve of the opening of the Congress, and stressed once again the important role of literature in the current reform, calling on literary writing to "reveal the present conflicts and real contradictions," and to reflect the fierce struggles in reform. He required the writers to apply more fully the democratic principles of the socialist system, conduct criticism and self-criticism, and bring things in the open on a wide scale, overcoming all rigid phenomena in all social organizations, including all unions of creative arts." These words practically set the key tone of the congress.

The recent congress had the following characteristics. First, compared with past congresses, the sum-up report delivered by (Markov) [Maerkefu 7456 1422 4430 1133] could be called "low-keyed." It dealt with concrete matters relating to work. Although he affirmed the accomplishments scored in literature in recent years, many shortcomings, mistakes and real contradictions were pointed out, and an all-around examination made of writing conditions, work of the union of writers, and literary critique, and some measures for improvement proposed, in order that literature might well accept the "challenge of the times." The practice of being bold in looking straight at the facts, and telling the truth has in itself displayed the spirit of reform. This can be seen as an expression of self-confidence.

Second, the recent congress was rather active and lively. Just as the poet Yevtushenko put it, it was carried on in a "free and genuinely

democratic atmosphere." The delegates spoke without restraint, aired their views boldly, and conducted criticism by name. For example, the work of a famous writer was criticized by name at the congress. Who up to then no one had dared criticize, further, the improper practices in the reelection of the secretariat of the largest organization of writers, the Moscow Union of Writers, and the election of delegates to the congress was openly revealed. The speeches delivered at the recent congress were not conducted in the usual way of reading item by item from manuscripts, but in "concrete and heated debate," with different views contested. The whole atmosphere was harmonious and healthy. On certain specific questions (for example, the evaluation of the present conditions of Soviet literature and positive characteristics,) the differences between writers seemed to be very great, but their general goals and their attitude on some basic issues was unanimous. They all believe that the main task at present is to "make the development of literature and the scope of reform under way at home compatible with each other" they said that they would "always be loyal to the principle of writing by using realism in expressing life."

Under the situation of reform, the writers urgently required an "essential change" in the work of the Union of Writers. At the recent congress, many delegations made sharp criticism on the "bad bureaucratic practices" of the Union of Writers. Novelist Granin pointed out, the leading organ of the Union of Writers had become some kind of "government organ," "lost its initiative," and was busy with their routine work without paying attention to writing. Novelist Zalygin believes that, the literary circles should not put everything too rigidly under control, going in for the so-called "centralization," which will inevitably lead to the oppression of some writers by other writers." Many people proposed to abolish life tenure in leading posts, and to genuinely carry out democratic elections, with those famous writers free from "bureaucratism" elected to the leading posts. We should say that the recent congress was a good beginning in this respect. Democracy was brought forward in an election, a reshuffle was realized in the leading body, the original first secretary (Markov) [Maerkefu 7456 1422 4430 1133] has been appointed Chairman of the Union of Writers, while (Karpov) [Kaerbofu 0595 1422 3134 1133] has been appointed first secretary. The other six secretaries of the standing committee are all writers with very good reputations.

How to improve and strengthen literary criticism was one of the main topics of the recent congress. As is known to all, the Soviet leadership has all along attached great importance to literary and art criticism, regarding it as a chief means to exert some influence on writing. But in recent years, literary critiques have not played their due role, therefore, it has been subjected to severe criticism by the Soviet leadership. However, there are problems as well as difficulties in literary criticism. No wonder the critic (Kuzniezhov) [Kuzineizuofu 1655 3320 3206 1133] complained that the critics are at present in "a state of humiliation." The recent congress on the one hand, revealed the shortcomings in literary criticism and on the other hand, repeatedly stressed its significance, noting that the reform of literary criticism itself will determine "the

ideological quality and the future of literature." It was decided to adopt specific measures to improve the quality of critics, and to raise their social status and treatment. The Gorkiy Institute of Literature has decided to set up a faculty of literary criticism in order to develop qualified people in this field.

A question much talked about was the difficulty in getting books published. The poet Voznesensky said with some exaggeration: "Sometimes a writer will spend one-tenth of his lifetime writing, while nine-tenths of his lifetime will be spent on trying to get his works published." The reasons for the difficulties in getting books published are manifold; one of which is too many literary works are written but there is not enough publishing capacity. Regarding poetry alone, around 8,000 volumes of manuscripts are ready for print on an annual basis, with only 2,500 of them published. Some people are taking advantage of their power in their posts and publish their own books in large volume, which makes the contradictions all the more acute. Then there are bad practices in the censorship system. Those mediocre works are more easily passed, while excessive nitpicking is done on those works with originality. Hence, the strange phenomenon of "the reading public complaining about too many books of low quality, while the writers are complaining about the difficulties in getting books published." When the writers cited the above-mentioned problems, they also proposed what is necessary to reform the existing censorship system.

Worthy of note was the fact that some delegates proposed the reprinting of some forbidden books. Those who are familiar with the history of Soviet literature know that after the October Revolution, a number of famous writers adopted an antagonistic or non-cooperative attitude toward the Soviet regime, and some of them were even exiled abroad. Later, some writers were under repudiated for various reasons. Their works are banned and are not allowed to be reprinted in the Soviet Union, but are very popular in the West. Therefore, Director Likhachev said in his speech, the results of literature in the early 20th century should not all be "sent to the West," but that works of such writers as Andrey Bely, Fyodor Sologdy, (Lemizhov) [Liemizhuofu 0411 4717 1563 1133] and (Melezhkovsky) [Meilierifefusiji 2734 0441 2480 1133 2448 1015] should be published selectively. Many people suggested publishing the complete works of Pasternak, who had been repudiated for his book "Dr Zhivago." Voznesensky proposed that the repudiation of (Ahmatova) [Ahetuowa 7093 4378 2094 1216] and (Zocsenko) [Zuogingke 1563 3830 4430] in the 1946 Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik) Revolution should be corrected as should the error in the evaluation of the opera "The Great Friendship." These suggestions expressed the hope of some writers for further relaxation in literature and art policy.

Looking at the speeches in the congress, the attention of the delegates seemed to have focused on the various aspects mentioned above, while no earnest and in-depth discussion unfolded on a series of theoretical and practical problems in literary creation which have been in endless dispute, such as the theory on socialist realism; the issue of positive characters;

the truthfulness and modern nature of literature; the method of assumption and recording of actual events. This can be said to be regretful.

The recent congress has broken the dullness of Soviet literary circles, and brought hope to those who want to change the present conditions. However, others have expressed their worries: "Will everything remain the same as soon as the congress concludes"? Perhaps such worries are not superfluous, but the development of the situation, the delicate changes in literature and art policy, and all signs shown by the contingent of writers demonstrates that this congress, called the "turning stage," may become a turning point, and marked changes may take place in literary circles after the congress. At the same time, we can expect that the struggles between different ideologies are inevitable and can be very intense at times.

/12858

CSO: 4005/007

## LIAOWANG ON USSR'S CHANGING MIDDLE-EAST POLICY

HK090717 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 35, 1 Sep 86  
p 25

[Article by Wang Lianzhi [3769 6647 1807]: "Readjustment of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East as Seen from the Soviet-Israeli Talks"]

[Text] Soviet and Israeli diplomatic officials held the first round of formal talks on the consular issue in Helsinki on 18 August. This was the first open, official contact after a 19-year hiatus in diplomatic relations since the 1967 Middle East war. Thus the close attention of international society.

The talk was held on the initiative of the Soviet Union, with the active response of Israel. The talks, which were scheduled to last 2 days, broke up abruptly after 30 minutes.

Despite the fact that the meeting resulted in nothing, Israeli officials found it "satisfactory" to eventually recover official contacts with the Soviet Union, and believed that the meeting was an initial step to realizing the normalization of the diplomatic relations between the two countries and that the recent meeting was "by no means a failure." The Soviet representatives also said that the meeting was "truth-seeking and constructive." However, in a 19 August statement by a Soviet official spokesman, the meeting was said to have "led into a dead alley" "without reaching any accord"; hence, it was a "failure." He also reproached the Israeli representatives for "roughly intervening in Soviet internal affairs" by raising the issue of Soviet Jews. In analyzing the inconsistent Soviet positions, some Middle East experts pointed out that the fact that the Soviets first agreed to hold talks was a posture to the Israelis, then they shortened the talks to make a posture to the Arabs. In fact, the Soviets attempted to benefit from both sides.

In the 19-year hiatus in Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations, both sides have all along maintained private contacts through various channels, and probes have been made on several occasions for the normalization of diplomatic relations. However, the Soviets did not dare to act rashly because of the strong reactions of some Arab countries. The Arab world has been largely cautious and moderate in its response to the recent visit



of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Morocco. At the same time, such East European countries as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria have been expanding their relations with Israel. The Soviet Union took the opportunity to hold talks on the consular issue with Israel in order to pave the way for restoring normal diplomatic relations. This incident demonstrates the initiatives and flexibility of Soviet diplomatic trends in the Middle East.

Another reason for the Soviet Union to readjust its relations with Israel is the fact that it has for years advocated calling an international conference on the Middle East issue to seek a comprehensive solution to the Arabic-Israeli conflict. However, because of the resolute opposition of the United States and Israel, the Soviet wish did not come true. But since early autumn 1985, Israel has relaxed its position on this issue. Peres has on several occasions said that so long as normal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel are restored, Israel will accept Soviet participation in the international conference on Middle East peace. The Soviet Union is hoping to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in order to have a greater right to speak on the Middle East issue.

Improving relations with Israel is just one Soviet step in adjusting its Middle East policy, and it will inevitably be conditioned by the Soviets' overall interest in the Middle East, especially its relations with the Arabs. People have begun to notice that since the beginning of this year, with the U.S. bombardment of Libya serving to widen the gap between the United States and some Arab countries in particular, the Soviet Union has stepped up and set in order its diplomacy in the Middle East; it is very active, and has been manifested as follows:

It has continued to consolidate its relations with Syria and Libya, providing Libya with more advanced guided missiles and airplanes and helping it to recover its defense capability.

It has focused on doing work among moderate Arabic states, expanding its influence in the Arab world. The Soviet Union has frequently sent people to visit Egypt and Arab countries in the Gulf and North African region, and established diplomatic relations with the Sultanate of Oman. The Soviet Union has paid particular attention to taking advantage of its opponent's weak points, satisfying the actual needs of the Arab countries. When the United States indefinitely postponed military aid to Jordan, the Soviet Union reached an accord with Jordan on selling it arms. When the United States cancelled its sale of air-defense guided missiles to Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union actively expressed willingness to provide Saudi Arabia with SAM-7's.

On Lebanon, the Soviet Union has changed its usual attitude and agreed to postpone the deadline of UN troops stationed in Lebanon. When the U.S. Congress decided to reduce financial aid for these troops, the Soviet Union declared that it would provide financial aid and hinted that it would send Warsaw Pact troops to participate in the stationing; as a result, the United States had to change its attitude. The Soviet Union has also

focused on establishing ties with all sects in Lebanon, Christian sects in particular, and even expressed willingness to act as a mediator in resolving the contradictions between antagonistic sects in Lebanon.

The Soviet Union has changed its attitude of criticizing the PLO with 'Arafat as the mainstream. Gorbachev personally met 'Arafat in the FRG. The Soviet Union received PLO Political Department Director Quaddumi. With Soviet help, Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestine Communist Party, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Arab Liberation Front consecutively held conferences in Tunis and Moscow respectively between late July and early August, and important progress was made in restoring unity to the PLO. Having the PLO card in hand, is obviously favorable for the Soviet Union in expanding its influence in the Middle East.

Greater flexibility in handling Middle East affairs is an important component of the overall readjustment of Soviet foreign policy since Gorbachev came into office. The Soviet Union has always regarded the Middle East as a strategic interest. However, since the end of the Middle East war in October 1973, the United States has gradually repelled the Soviet Union from the Middle East peace process through secret diplomacy. Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has especially worsened relations with the Islamic world, with Soviet influence in the Middle East going from bad to worse--hence, its inferior position in contending with the United States. The new Soviet leader has made an overall examination of Soviet foreign policies. Gorbachev criticized Soviet practice in the Middle East for "being too rigid," believing that "the Soviets can achieve whatever the Americans are capable of doing." He also stressed that "the Soviet Union should play a legitimate role in the Middle East. Without the participation of the Soviet Union, no peace action in the region will be successful."

The Soviet readjustment of its Middle East policy and the progress made have aroused U.S. vigilance. As disclosed by U.S. officials, the Department of State and the National Security Council are studying the Middle East situation in order to determine a way in which the United States can play a more active role in the region. Secretary of State Shultz has taken into consideration a plan to visit the Middle East. President Reagan is trying to arrange for a summit between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan in Washington in September [sic]. Superpower competition over the Middle East is intensifying once again.

/9604

CSO: 4005/51

## NAKASONE DISCUSSES DATE FOR GORBACHEV VISIT

OW281816 Beijing XINHUA in English 1802 GMT 28 Aug 86

[Excerpt] Tokyo, August 28 (XINHUA)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said today that the date for a visit to Japan by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is likely to be settled in September, the KYODO NEWS SERVICE reported.

Nakasone, speaking at the summer resort of Karuizawa, in Nagano Prefecture, southwest of Tokyo, was quoted by KYODO as saying that he hopes to meet Gorbachev in Tokyo next January.

The prime minister said Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze will discuss the exact schedule of the visit when they meet at the United Nations General Assembly next month.

Meanwhile, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa and Foreign Minister Kuranari agreed during a meeting this morning that their countries should try to make Gorbachev's visit "yield positive results," Foreign Ministry officials said.

Kuranari said Japan will not adopt a policy of separating politics and economics in various negotiations between the two countries.

The Japanese foreign minister was referring to Japan's stance that it has no plans to improve economic relations with the Soviet Union by ignoring the territorial dispute over the four small islands off Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido, the officials said. The islands have been occupied by the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.

Kuranari also made a veiled criticism of Moscow's recent unilateral extension of its moratorium on testing nuclear weapons, saying that finding ways to realistically eliminate nuclear weapons should not remain merely an exercise in words.

/6662

CSO: 4000/4

## VODK COMMENTS ON HARARE NONALIGNED SUMMIT

OW291320 Beijing XINHUA in English 1124 GMT 29 Aug 86

[Excerpts] Beijing, August 29 (XINHUA)--The Kampuchean people hope the Non-aligned Movement will continue to play a role in protecting the interests of small and medium countries, said a commentary broadcast by Radio Democratic Kampuchea today.

The commentary said that the seat of Democratic Kampuchea, a founding member of the movement, has been made empty in the movement since its sixth summit meeting in Havana in 1979.

As the host and chairman of the Sixth Non-aligned Summit, Cuba had insisted that the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin regime should take the Kampuchean seat at the summit, a view which most of the other member countries strongly opposed.

Due to the summit chairman's violation of the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation, it said, the seat of Democratic Kampuchea has since then remained vacant in the Non-aligned Movement.

The Kampuchean people, the radio said, hope the issue will reach a conclusion at the Eighth Non-aligned Summit to be held in Harare, capital of Zimbabwe, on September 1.

Though the country has suffered from the Vietnamese aggression, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), based on its eight-point proposal, has continually sought a political means to ending the Kampuchea problem.

The proposal, unveiled by CGDK on March 17, 1986, calls for a two-phase military pullout by Vietnam from Kampuchea and the formation of a four-party coalition government, including the Hanoi-installed Heng Samrin regime. Hanoi has rejected the proposal.

/6662  
CSO: 4000/3

## BRIEFS

INDIA DENIES BUILDING NUCLEAR ARMS--New Delhi, August 30 (XINHUA)--Top officials of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) denied charges that India had obtained heavy water to run its three latest reactors for the building of nuclear weapons. The officials told newsmen here on Friday that because of some technical reasons the country was importing "some quantity" of heavy water from the Soviet Union, "but this is being done under an open agreement following the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." According to a study done by Gary Milholin, a U.S. nuclear energy expert, India is secretly building its nuclear weapon-making capability, while illegally diverting heavy water from its safeguarded reactors. The study was published in the latest issue of FOREIGN POLICY. [Excerpt] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0946 GMT 30 Aug 86 OW] /6662

CSO: 400/5

## XINHUA REVIEWS CHIRAC'S SOUTH PACIFIC VISIT

OW011401 Beijing XINHUA in English 1116 GMT 1 Sep 86

["Roundup: Chirac Winds up South Pacific Visit (by Wang Wei)"--XINHUA headline]

[Excerpts] Paris, September 1 (XINHUA)--French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac winds up his four-day visit to French South Pacific colonies today, after examining cautiously the issue of New Caledonia's independence and reasserting the French presence in the region.

Chirac, who visited New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, was on his first tour of the French overseas territories since taking office in March. One of his main concerns was New Caledonia, where a referendum on its fate will be held next year.

Chirac's visit came at a time when pressure is mounting from South Pacific countries for France to grant independence to New Caledonia and remove its military presence from the region, including halting its controversial nuclear tests.

Last month, a "South Pacific Forum" conference of senior officials from France's traditional partners of Australia and New Zealand as well as 11 other Pacific island countries expressed support for New Caledonia and asked that the United Nations include the islands on its decolonization list.

During his current South Pacific visit, Chirac said he was preoccupied by Australia's attitude towards France. The desire to create a situation leading to French retirement from the region will do Australia no good, especially at the moment when the Soviet Union becomes interested in the region, he said.

Chirac stressed that France is in the same camp as Australia and New Zealand and that the European nation will maintain its presence in the South Pacific.

The French prime minister, while avoiding the issue of nuclear testing, said his country will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon countries, unless attacked by such countries that have nuclear-armed allies. He also expressed France's willingness to enter into talks with South Pacific countries on topics including disarmament.

/6662

CSO: 4000/6

LI PENG ON DEVELOPING VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

OW010446 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1122 GMT 29 Aug 86

[Excerpts] Beijing, 29 Aug (XINHUA)--An article by Comrade Li Peng carried in ZHONGGUO JIAOYU BAO [China Education] published on 30 August points out: Currently, the foundation of vocational and technical education in the country as a whole is still quite weak; in many rural areas vocational and technical education is non-existent. Therefore, during the Seventh 5-Year Plan, we should still regard the development of vocational and technical education as our principal task. As for certain provincial cities and areas where vocational and technical education has developed well, it may be readjusted in some key fields and further improved.

Entitled "Making Great Efforts To Develop Vocational and Technical Education Is the Important Content of Educational Reform," the article states: The purpose of such education is to train millions of junior and senior technicians, managers, skilled workers and other members of the labor force in urban and rural areas. Such education will enable more people to study and master advanced equipment, techniques and management and play a special important role in promoting China's four modernizations. The article points out: In any country, ordinary workers, junior and senior technicians, and managers are the majority operatives in industry, agriculture and tertiary industry, and are the main part of the population and principal creators of materials and property. It goes without saying that talented persons are very important. They make a decisive impact on a country's science and technology and even economic and cultural development. Considering the number of talented persons, however, they are the minority. This is particularly so in a developing country like China. This determines the important position and role of vocational and technical education.

The article says: China's vocational and technical education has developed rapidly over the past few years. A number of good vocational and technical schools have been established in some areas. The proportion of vocational and technical school students in the total number of senior middle school students rose from 5 percent in the period after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee to 18.8 percent in 1980, and reached 36 percent last year. In a number of municipalities and provinces--such as Beijing and Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong and Jiangsu--the proportion has even

exceeded more than 60 percent. Vocational and technical education, however, is developing unevenly in the country. It is developing rapidly in a few areas, but in many areas its development is insufficient. Particularly in rural areas its development is very slow. A number of provinces and regions where the economy is not well developed have paid little attention to vocational and technical education. This has badly hurt local economic development. Therefore, leading comrades at various levels should pay full attention to developing various types of vocational and technical education, especially in the rural areas.

The article believes that it is necessary to adhere to the principle of pre-employment training so as to develop vocational and technical education. The article says: This principle is an important measure to enable the educational structural reform and the reform of the labor and personnel system to supplement each other to form a complete system, and its fundamental purpose is to raise worker quality by forcing workers to receive certain pre-employment training in politics, culture and techniques. Therefore, education and labor departments and industrial sectors must stick to this principle laid down by the central authorities. Of course, we should not demand uniformity in everything while implementing this principle. We must not act or think in terms of absolutes. Differences should be made in accordance with different trades and types of work. The article points out: During the process of implementing the principle of pre-employment training, we often encounter the problem of not knowing whether the hiring units and labor departments have given priority to hiring the graduates of various vocational and technical schools. Generally speaking, if the graduates' special training matches the job requirements, and if they are qualified, they should be hired first because they have received fairly systematic training. The hiring units and the labor departments should make sure that this guideline is followed. Of course, an employment priority does not mean that a job will be guaranteed. This requires that our schools produce competent graduates. Incompetent students and students of poor conduct will not enjoy employment priority, nor will those whose training does not match job requirements.

The article also touches on the question of training vocational and technical school teachers through multiple channels. The article says: Comparatively speaking, technical secondary schools and technician schools have more qualified teachers, while vocational senior middle schools and vocational training centers at various levels lack qualified teachers. This is the heart of the matter which affects the quality of teaching today. This problem can only be resolved through various channels. The article points out: The State Education Commission and all provincial and municipal educational administrative departments should work earnestly over the next 3 to 5 years to build a large continent of vocational and technical school teachers.

/12858

CSO: 4005/007



SHAANXI RIBAO ON EDUCATION IN REFORM

HK310806 Xian SHAANXI RIBAO in Chinese 9 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Mao Shengxian [3029 3932 6897]: "In the Rural Areas It Is Necessary To Carry Out In-Depth Ideological Education in Reforms and in Developing the Commodity Economy"--passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Excerpts] The current situation in the rural areas is very good. The large number of cadres and masses enthusiastically support and energetically implement the CPC Central Committee's principles and policies on rural work, and great achievements have been made in this respect. Reforms and the policy of opening up to the world and enlivening the domestic economy have raised the curtain on the transition in the rural areas from the self-supporting economy to the commodity economy and from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture. The people keep forging ahead toward the future and their mental outlook has taken on a new aspect. In our forward march, we should develop this good situation and spare no efforts in carrying out the second step of reforms in the rural areas so as to bring the great social reform in the rural areas to an entirely new stage.

In line with the CPC Central Committee's guiding principle that ideological and political work in the new period should cater to the party's general tasks and general targets, the general task in ideological and political work in the rural areas in the present period is to mobilize and educate party members, cadres, and masses in the rural areas to unite as one and work hard to change the backward economic and cultural situation in the rural areas, to become better off, and to build socialist new rural areas with a high degree of material and spiritual civilizations. The key to fulfilling this general task is to carry out ideological education in reforms and in developing the commodity economy, on the basis of which education in policies, ideals, discipline, democracy, the legal system, morality, conduct, party spirit, party style, and party discipline should be given to the masses and party members.

Why is it necessary to stress the importance of carrying out education in reforms and in developing the commodity economy? The first reason is that the rural masses urgently want to change their backward situation. To achieve this end, the proper way is to reform the rural economic structure, management system, and production technology, to develop the production of

socialist commodities, and to realize a high degree of socialization and modernization in production. Therefore, like other work, ideological and political work in the rural areas should be suited to the development of the commodity economy. The second reason is that our cadres and masses still lack the knowledge of the commodity economy and that the mentality of the small-peasant economy is still deep-rooted. Without carrying out education in developing the commodity economy, our cadres and masses will not be able to free themselves from the binds of the traditional mentality and to become masters in developing the commodity economy. The third reason is that in ideological and political work in the rural areas, ideological education in developing the commodity economy has not been placed in a proper position. If this is not changed, ideological and political work will fall behind the development of the new situation.

/First, while carrying out in-depth ideological education in reforms and in developing the commodity economy, it is necessary to conscientiously study and extensively propagate the basic knowledge and basic policy concerning the commodity economy and to enable cadres and the masses to gradually form a commodity economic mentality and to familiarize themselves with the law governing the operation of the commodity economy./

It is necessary to encourage cadres and the masses to familiarize themselves with the following basic viewpoints:

--The full development of the commodity economy is a necessary phase in the development of the social economy. Developing the commodity economy is the only way to realizing a high degree of socialization and modernization in production as well as to rapidly developing the social productive forces. As the socialist commodity economy is a planned commodity economy under public ownership, it is fundamentally different from the capitalist commodity economy. In this connection, it is necessary to enhance our understanding of the necessity and importance of developing the commodity economy and to dispel some people's misgivings concerning its development.

--The commodity economy requires a high degree of socialization and specialization in production. For this reason, it is necessary to bring into full play the strong points of local resources and labor force; to carry out the overall development of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production, and fishery; to develop rural industry, commerce, service trades, transportation, and building industry; to open up all avenues for production; and to change the single-product economy so as to allow the rural economy to thrive and to increase the peasants' income.

Propagating, studying, and mastering these basic viewpoints on the commodity economy is not only a theoretical problem but also an urgent practical problem. Therefore, we should put this education on the agenda, make detailed arrangements for it, compile systematic teaching materials, and organize people in various fields so that this education is carried out in a planned way. In line with the practice of reforms, leaders at various levels should take the lead in studying the theory of the socialist

commodity economy and improve their understanding of and leadership over the work of developing the commodity economy. This education should be carried out in various production activities, in the teaching activities of party and cadre schools, in the theoretical study of cadres, in the training of basic-level cadres, in the popularization of science and technology, in the consolidation campaign of enterprises, in the activities of party, youth league, and mass organizations, in press propaganda, and in various cultural activities of the masses so that it becomes an important process of restudy by the entire people. It is necessary to combine this education with the practice of reforms and with the implementation of the party's principles and policies on rural work, so that we can achieve actual results in guiding and promoting work in the present period.

/Second, it is necessary to educate rural cadres and masses to break away from the traditional mentality of the small-peasant economy, to get rid of their mental burden, and to boldly develop the commodity economy./

The process of rural cadres and masses accepting the concept of the commodity economy is also the process of their breaking away from the mentality of the small-peasant economy. This is a profound revolution in the ideological sphere in the rural areas and is a key issue of educating the peasants in the new period. Although the mentality of the small-peasant economy does not hold sway in the ideological sphere in the rural areas, its negative influence's still permeating our work in various fields.

Obviously, the mentality of the small-peasant economy is a big obstacle to the development of the commodity economy as well as to scientific and technological progress. To speedily develop the commodity economy, it is necessary to eradicate the mentality of the small-peasant economy, and this should be taken as an important strategic task in our ideological work. Of course, we should not be overanxious for quick results in this connection. We should not hope that this mentality, which has remained in people's minds for several thousand years, can be eliminated in one morning, still less should we use the simple and rough method of mass criticism to solve this problem. The correct method is to establish the new and destroy the old, to extensively propagate the knowledge of the commodity economy, to popularize the historical experience in foreign and domestic economic and cultural development, and to improve the people's ideological level. In addition, contradictions should not be evaded and the method of reasoning should be used to analyze the backwardness and harm of the mentality of the small-peasant economy so as to encourage people to break away from traditional concepts. What is more important is to introduce actual examples of developing commodity production and to guide the peasants household by household in developing the commodity economy and commodity production so that they will increase their knowledge in the course of practice.

/Third, we should guide rural cadres and masses in holding firm to a correct political orientation and should bring into full play the role of socialist spiritual civilization in ensuring and promoting the development of the commodity economy./

The development of the commodity economy is an indispensable condition for carrying out socialist modernization, and socialist spiritual civilization is an indispensable guarantee for developing the commodity economy. The extensive development of the socialist commodity economy will also give rise to certain blindness in the economic field. Some people who are influenced by the ideology of the exploiting class will take advantage of the relationship between commodities and money to engage in speculation, racketeering, and smuggling, thus harming public interests and the planned socialist economy as well as fostering capitalist factors. To prevent the emergence of these negative phenomena in the commodity economy, not only is it necessary to work out correct policies and measures and to exercise planned regulation, administration, and management, but it is also important to educate the masses to resist all erroneous tendencies so as to pave the way for the healthy development of the commodity economy. We should persist in reforms and criticize and correct mistakes. This is a correct attitude. Thinking that mistakes in reforms should not be examined and corrected is not really supporting reforms but diverting reforms to some other channels.

The first point is to educate cadres and the masses to adhere to socialist principles and correct methods in developing the commodity economy.

The second point is to educate cadres and the masses to enhance their patriotic and collective spirit and to correctly handle the relationship of interests between the state, the collective, and the individual. Bearing in mind overall and long-term interests, cadres and the masses should conscientiously implement state policies and decrees, should not seek personal gain at the expense of state and collective interests, and should oppose all activities violating law and discipline. By protecting state and collective interests, they will protect their greatest interests. In the relationship between people, we advocate the idea of allowing some people to become better off ahead of others, of encouraging the better off to help the poor, and of finally achieving the target of common prosperity. We encourage competition in the commodity economy but are opposed to capitalist practices such as deception, fraud, speculation, and racketeering. We should persist in the principle of more pay for more work and in the meantime advocate the communist spirit of not being particular about pay and of taking pride in helping others and in vying for more contributions. This new type of relationship serves as an indispensable spiritual pillar in developing the commodity economy.

The third point is to educate cadres and the masses to develop morality and good conduct in society so as to create an excellent environment for reform and development of the commodity economy. The main aspect of social morality and conduct in the rural areas is good, and cadres and the masses are busy with reforms and are working hard to become better off. A new and dynamic atmosphere has taken shape. However, some problems have also arisen and become obstacles to rural reforms and the development of the commodity economy. Theft and destruction are very serious in some localities, either state, collective, and private property being stolen or forests, irrigation projects, power stations, broadcasting stations,

and telephone facilities being destroyed. This still remains unresolved. Gambling is rampant in some parts of the rural areas both during busy and slack seasons. Not only the masses but cadres also gamble. Feudal superstition prevails in some rural areas, where people keep building temples and worshipping ghosts and deities and witches and wizards are deceiving people. Some reactionary religious organizations are resuming their activities. In some localities, disputes over civic affairs are becoming serious, and fights frequently occur. Some people are in the habit of occupying others' farmland. They have formed clan associations and elected their heads. This has given rise to clan conflicts. Ugly phenomena of the old society such as prostitution and child abduction have also emerged. All these have affected the excellent social morality in the rural areas and normal social order.

The emergence of these phenomena has been due to a lack of strict management. By strict management, we mean that we should carry out education in "four have's." In particular, we should educate young people well so as to improve their ideological consciousness. We should do a good job in building civilized towns and villages, "five good" families, and households with the two civilizations, commend the advanced, help the backward, correct the evil, and develop fine habits. What is of particular importance is to strengthen basic-level organizations, provide good training to basic-level cadres, and bring into better play the management role of basic-level organizations. It is necessary to educate, support, and supervise basic-level cadres in such a way that they exert their revolutionary spirit, adhere to the party line, principles and policy, observe party discipline and state law, and are bold in fighting all unhealthy practices and in cracking down on and forbidding theft, gambling, feudal superstition, and all other ugly phenomena ruining the general mood of society. This will help bring about a turn for the better in social habits. With strict control, evil practices will diminish; without control, they will become more serious. This is a truth and an important experience to be remembered.

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CSO: 4005/51

INCREASE IN NUMBER OF ILLEGAL DETENTIONS

HK170837 Hong Kong AFP in English 0734 GMT 17 Sep 86

[Text] Beijing, 17 Sep (AFP)---The number of reported illegal detentions in China almost doubled in the first six months of 1986, during which 140 prisoners were killed or injured, an official newspaper received here Wednesday said.

Police and local cadres, abusing their official powers, were responsible for a large portion of the reported illegal detentions, which increased 96.5 percent in the first half of 1986 compared to reports for the preceding six months, the CHINA LEGAL NEWS said Tuesday.

"Most of these cases were committed by several people together. They used particularly cruel and vile methods, generally with a serious result," the newspaper said, citing information from "the departments concerned."

Of the 949 people illegally detained, 140 were killed or injured, the report said, but gave no details on how the casualties occurred. Analysts said that, based on recent Chinese press reports, torture was likely to have been used in many of the cases. The report said that the number of illegal detentions had been increasing steadily in recent years.

Abuses of power resulting in unauthorized detentions were on the rise because those responsible were frequently let off with light punishments while the general population did not know that their methods were illegal, the report added.

Analysts said the increase was also likely to reflect improved reporting practices and greater attention to the rule of law.

CHINA LEGAL NEWS said the illegal detentions fell into three groups, those carried out by local cadres, those carried out by police, and those carried out by individuals involved in civil or economic disputes.

Some cases of the latter type resulted when one partner to a business dispute detained the other as a hostage, forcing family members to pay off debts in order to gain the victim's release.

In other cases people detained others at will, simply relying on their own family's force, the report said.

Legal departments attempting to deal with such cases were hindered by protective friends and relations of offenders with the results that investigations were slow and punishments light, the report added.

It concluded by calling for various courts and inspection organs to increase their efforts in handling such cases.

The report, said by observers to be the most frank on the problem yet released in the official press, follows a series of reports on specific incidents in the Chinese press.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY on Monday said that a member of the National People's Congress had been arrested for detaining 72 people and torturing 17 he suspected of stealing part of his bicycle bell.

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CSO: 4000/007

REGULATIONS ON OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

OW091401 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1145 GMT 5 Sep 86

[Text] Beijing, 5 Sep (XINHUA)--Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order of the People's Republic of China

Adopted by the 17th session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth NPC on 5 September 1986.

Chapter One: General Principles

Article 1. These regulations are drawn up for the purpose of improving the control of public order, maintaining social order and public security, protecting citizens' legitimate rights and interests, and ensuring the smooth progress of socialist modernization.

Article 2. Anyone who disturbs social order, disrupts public safety, infringes on another citizen's personal rights, or encroaches on public or private property commits a crime according to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. The offender shall have his criminal responsibilities investigated. Should the act be punishable as a public offense, and not as a criminal felony, it should be handled according to these regulations.

Article 3. These regulations are applicable to public offenses committed within the territory of the People's Republic of China, except for those which the law has prescribed otherwise.

These regulations are also applicable to public offenses committed aboard boats and ships, or on aircraft, of the People's Republic of China.

Article 4. Public security organs shall handle public offenders according to the principle of combining education and punishment.

Article 5. Public security organs may handle through mediation minor public offenses such as fistfights or damage to property resulting from disputes among people.



## Chapter Two: Types of Punishment and Their Application

Article 6. The following three types of punishment for public offenders have been established:

- 1) Warning.
- 2) Fines: From 1 yuan to not more than 200 yuan. Separate rules stipulated in Articles 30, 31, and 32 shall be applied in handling offenses stipulated in those Articles.
- 3) Detention: From 1 day to not more than 15 days.

Article 7. Property acquired through offenses against public order, or contraband goods that have been apprehended, shall be returned to the original owner, or confiscated, according to regulations. Tools used by offenders against public order may be confiscated according to regulations. Specific measures shall be drawn up by the Ministry of Public Security.

Article 8. Offenders against public order shall be held responsible for paying for losses or medical expenses, should there be losses or injuries caused by public offenses. In case a public order offender is handicapped or partially handicapped and is unable to pay for losses or afford indemnity, his guardian shall be responsible for paying or bearing the indemnity according to law.

Article 9. Public order offenders having reached the age of 14, but not yet 18, receive a lesser punishment. Offenders under 14 shall not be punished, but shall be reprimanded, and their guardians shall be charged with the responsibility of disciplining them.

Article 10. Mentally ill persons who offend public order when they cannot control their conduct shall not be punished; but their guardians shall be instructed to subject them to strict surveillance and give them medical treatment. Intermittently mentally ill persons who offend public order when they are mentally normal shall be punished.

Article 11. Deaf, mute, or blind people who commit public offenses because of physiological defects shall not be punished.

Article 12. People who commit public offenses when they are drunk are punishable. An intoxicated person whose inebriation may endanger himself or others shall be restrained until he becomes sober.

Article 13. When one person has committed two or more public offenses they shall be adjudicated separately but punished together.

Article 14. When two or more people have committed a public offense, they shall be handled separately according to the seriousness of each individual case.

Anyone who instigates, coerces, or induces another to commit a public offense shall be handled according to the way he instigates, coerces, or induces.

Article 15. When an official organ, a group, an enterprise, or an institution commits a public offense, its direct sponsor shall be punished. If the offense is instigated by the supervisor of a unit, the supervisor shall also be punished.

Article 16. If the public offense falls under one of the following categories, it may receive a lesser--or no--punishment:

- 1) The case is a particularly minor one;
- 2) The offender takes the initiative in admitting his mistakes and promptly correcting them;
- 3) The offense is caused by another person's coercion or inducement.

Article 17. Heavier punishment should be meted out for public order offenses under one of the following circumstances:

- 1) The offense results in grave consequences;
- 2) The offender forces and induces others or directs other persons under 18 years of age to violate the public order regulations;
- 3) The offender retaliates against the accuser and the witness or witnesses;
- 4) The offender repeatedly commits crimes without repentance.

Article 18. No punishment shall be meted out for violations against the public order regulations if the violations are not discovered by public security organs within 6 months.

The period of 6 months mentioned in the previous paragraph shall take effect from the day the violation against the public order regulations is committed; if the violation of the regulations involves successive or continuous action, the period shall take effect from the day the action ends.

### Chapter Three: Violations of the Public Order Regulations and Punishments

Article 19. Persons who commit one of the following offenses against public order and which do not yet deserve criminal punishment shall be detained not more than 15 days, or fined not more than 200 yuan, or be given a warning:

- 1) Persons who disrupt the order in government departments, public organizations, enterprises, and institutions, thus making it impossible

to carry on normal work, production, business, medical services, teaching work, and scientific research, but whose offense has not yet caused serious losses;

2) Persons who disrupt order in vehicle stations, docks, civilian air terminals, markets, commercial centers, parks, movie theaters, recreation centers, sports stadiums, exhibition halls, or other public places;

3) Persons who disrupt order in public buses, streetcars, trains, vessels, and other means of transportation;

4) Persons who become involved in gang fights, pick quarrels, stir up trouble, insult women, or carry out other acts of hooliganism;

5) Persons who spread rumors to mislead the public, and incite the public to make trouble;

6) Persons who make false reports on incidents with the intention of creating confusion;

7) Persons who obstruct state functionaries in the execution of their duties, but who do not resort to violence and threats in doing so.

Article 20. Persons who commit one of the following offenses of hampering public safety shall be detained not more than 15 days, or fined not more than 200 yuan, or be given a warning:

1) Persons who illegally carry and keep firearms and ammunition, or who violate other provisions of the regulations governing the control of firearms, but whose offense does not call for criminal punishment;

2) Persons who violate the regulations governing the control of explosive, poisonous, flammable, radioactive, and other hazardous materials by manufacturing, storing, transporting, and using such materials, but whose offense has not yet caused serious consequences;

3) Persons who illegally manufacture, sell, or carry daggers, three-pronged knives, jackknives, or other sharp instruments;

4) Persons who run hotels, restaurants, theaters, amusement centers, sports stadiums, exhibition halls, or other places for the masses to gather, in violation of the safety regulations and who make no effort to correct the situation after being notified by public security departments;

5) Persons who fail to adopt good safety measures in organizing mass rallies or cultural, amusement, sports, or other activities such as exhibitions and exhibition sales involving many people, and who make no effort to correct the situation after being notified by public security departments;

6) Persons who violate ferryboat or ferry safety regulations and take no correctional measures after being notified by public security organizations;

7) Persons who rush to board ferryboats despite being dissuaded from doing so, and as a result overload them, or force ferryboat pilots to violate safety regulations and navigate in a risky manner, but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;

8) Persons who dig pits or caves, place barriers, or destroy or remove signposts along railways, highways, and waterways and on dikes or dams, thus possibly affecting traffic safety, but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment.

Article 21. Persons who commit one of the following offenses of hampering public security shall be fined not more than 200 yuan or given a warning:

1) Persons who build or use shooting ranges for civilian use, violating safety regulations;

2) Persons who install or use electrified nets without approval, or install or use electrified nets which violate safety regulations, but whose offense has not resulted in serious consequences;

3) Persons who engage in construction in places where vehicles or pedestrians pass through and fail to cover ditches, wells, holes, or pits or to erect warning signs, or deliberately destroy covers or warning signs.

Article 22. Persons who commit one of the following offenses of infringing upon other people's personal rights, but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment, shall be detained not more than 15 days, or fined not more than 200 yuan, or given a warning:

1) Persons who beat up other people and cause slight injury;

2) Persons who illegally limit other people's personal freedom or illegally intrude into other people's quarters;

3) Persons who openly insult other people or fabricate stories slandering other people;

4) Persons who abuse their own family members, who call for having their cases taken care of;

5) Persons who write blackmailing letters or use other measures to threaten other people's safety or interfere with other people's normal life;

6) Persons who coerce or cajole persons under 18 years of age into giving a horrible or cruel performance which destroys their physical or mental health;

7) Persons who conceal, destroy, or open other people's mail or telegrams without permission.

Article 23. Persons who commit one of the following offenses of infringing upon public or private property but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment shall be detained not more than 15 days or given a warning with a concurrent fine of not more than 200 yuan, or be fined not more than 200 yuan:

- 1) Persons who engage in thievery, gain by cheating, or steal a small amount of public or private property;
- 2) Persons who steal and incite others to steal property of the state, a collective, or an individual;
- 3) Persons who extort public property or personal belongings;
- 4) Persons who deliberately damage public property or personal belongings.

Article 24. Persons who commit one of the following public offenses shall be detained not more than 15 days, fined not more than 200 yuan, or given a warning:

- 1) Persons who knowingly buy stolen goods;
- 2) Persons who resell train, bus, or steamer tickets, admission tickets for theatrical performances or athletic games, and other coupons, but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;
- 3) Persons who violate the government's prohibition by smoking opium or giving or taking injections of morphine or other narcotic drugs;
- 4) Persons who use feudalistic or superstitious means to disturb public order or gain property by cheating, but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;
- 5) Persons who drive other people's motor vehicles without permission.

Article 25. Persons who commit one of the following public offenses listed under clauses 1 to 3 shall be fined not more than 200 yuan or given a warning; those who commit one of the following public offenses listed under clauses 4 to 7 shall be fined not more than 50 yuan or given a warning:

- 1) Persons who hide and fail to report and deliver to the state cultural relics discovered underground, in inland waters or in territorial waters, and in other places of the country;
- 2) Seal-engraving dealers who make public seals in violation of control regulations but whose offense has not resulted in serious consequences;

- 3) Persons who deliberately tarnish or damage state-protected cultural relics, scenic spots, or historical sites, or damage sculptures in public places but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;
- 4) Persons who deliberately damage or arbitrarily remove road signs or traffic signs;
- 5) Persons who deliberately damage street lamps, mailboxes, public telephones, or other public facilities but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;
- 6) Persons who violate regulations by destroying lawns, flowers, or trees;
- 7) Persons who use sound equipment in urban areas in such a way that its loudness affects the work and rest of nearby residents, and who ignore warnings to stop making such a noise.

Article 26. Persons who commit one of the following offenses of violating the fire control regulations listed under clauses 1 to 4 shall be detained not more than 10 days, fined not more than 100 yuan, or be given a warning; those who commit one of the following offenses listed under clauses 5 to 8 shall be fined not more than 100 yuan or be given a warning:

- 1) Persons who deliberately obstruct the passage of fire engines or fire-fighting vessels or deliberately disrupt order at the scene of a fire but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;
- 2) Persons who disobey the command of fire-fighting directors at the scene of a fire, thus affecting fire-fighting and rescue work;
- 3) Persons whose negligence is the cause of a fire which has not resulted in heavy losses;
- 4) Persons who incite or force others to engage in risky work in violation of fire safety regulations but whose offense has not resulted in serious consequences;
- 5) Persons who violate fire safety regulations by occupying spaces marked for fire engines or by building sheds or houses, digging ditches, or building walls that obstruct the passage of fire engines;
- 6) Persons who bury, cover up, block, or damage fire hydrants, water pumps, water towers, water-storing ponds, or other fire-fighting facilities or who use fire-fighting materials or equipment for other purposes, and who refuse to change their ways after being notified by public security departments;
- 7) Persons who refuse to remove fire hazards after being notified by public security departments.

Article 27. When violating traffic regulations, persons who commit one of the following offenses listed under clauses 1 to 6 shall be detained not more than 15 days, fined not more than 200 yuan, or given a warning; those who, when violating traffic regulations, commit one of the following offenses listed under clauses 7 to 11 shall be fined not more than 50 yuan or be given a warning:

- 1) Persons who misuse or loan vehicle license plates or driving licenses to other people;
- 2) Persons who drive automobiles without a driving license or under the influence of alcohol, or allow people who have no driving license to use their automobiles;
- 3) Persons who disobey the commands of the people's police and obstruct traffic in violation of relevant regulations by participating in a rally or demonstration in an urban area;
- 4) Persons who unreasonably stop a vehicle to forcefully board it, thus affecting the normal operation of the vehicle, and who refuse to change their ways after being warned;
- 5) Persons who refuse to heed the warnings of public security personnel and forcefully pass through areas where clear prohibitive signs have been put up by public security departments at and above the county level;
- 6) Persons who cause traffic accidents as a result of violating traffic rules but whose offense does not merit criminal punishment;
- 7) Persons who drive automobiles which have not been inspected or approved for operation by traffic administrative departments;
- 8) Persons who drive automobiles with parts that do not meet safety requirements;
- 9) Persons who drive automobiles under the influence of alcohol;
- 10) Persons who incite or force drivers of automobiles to violate traffic regulations;
- 11) Persons who put up sheds, structures, or stalls, store materials in streets, or commit other offenses interfering with traffic.

Article 28. Any of the following offenses against traffic control shall be subject to a fine of not more than 5 yuan or a warning:

- 1) Driving a motor vehicle in violation of loading and speeding regulations, or of traffic signs and signals;
- 2) Violation of traffic regulations by drivers of nonmotorized vehicles or pedestrians;

- 3) Parking vehicles in areas specifically banned by traffic control departments for parking; and
- 4) Installing and using special sound alarm devices or signal lights in motor vehicles in violation of the law.

Article 29. Any of the offenses listed under clauses 1 to 3 against household registration or resident identity card management shall be subject to a fine of not more than 50 yuan or result in a warning, while the offenses listed under clauses 4 and 5 shall be subject to a fine of not more than 100 yuan or result in a warning:

- 1) Failure to take remedial steps after receiving notification from public security organs for not applying for household registration or resident identity cards pursuant to relevant regulations;
- 2) Falsely applying for household registration, or using the household registers or resident identity cards of other people;
- 3) Deliberately altering household registers;
- 4) Failure on the part of hotel operators to register hotel guests pursuant to relevant regulations; and
- 5) Failure to report and register tenants of houses or bed space pursuant to relevant regulations.

Article 30. Prostitution, whoring with unlicensed prostitutes, and making introductions or providing accommodations for prostitution and whoring with unlicensed prostitutes are strictly prohibited. Offenders shall be detained for not more than 15 days, or given a warning, or made to provide a written statement of repentance, or given education through labor pursuant to relevant regulations. They may be concurrently fined not more than 5,000 yuan. Criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law for those offenses that constitute crimes.

Whoring with a young girl under 14 years of age shall be punished as a crime of rape pursuant to Article 139 of the Criminal Law.

Article 31. The growing of opium poppy and other narcotics-yielding plants in violation of government regulations is strictly prohibited. Offenders shall not only be made to uproot the opium poppy and other narcotics-yielding plants they have grown, but shall also be detained for not more than 15 days. They may also be fined not more than 3,000 yuan separately or concurrently. Criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law for those offenses that constitute crimes.

Article 32. The following offenses are strictly prohibited:

1. Gambling or providing conditions for gambling; and



2. Producing, reproducing, selling, lending, or disseminating pornographic books, pictures, and video cassettes, or other obscene articles.

Any of the above mentioned offenses shall be punishable by not more than 15 days of detention. They are also punishable by a fine of not more than 3,000 yuan separately or concurrently, or by education through labor pursuant to relevant regulations. Criminal liability shall be pursued for those offenses that constitute crimes.

#### Chapter Four: Adjudication and Enforcement

Article 33. Offenses against public order shall be adjudicated by county and city public security bureaus and subbureaus, or by public security organs equivalent to the county level.

Warnings and fines of not more than 50 yuan may be served by local police stations; public security organs may entrust township (town) people's governments with adjudication in rural areas where there are no local police stations.

Article 34. Public security personnel may mete out punishment on the spot to an offender against public order who is given a warning or a fine of less than 50 yuan, or is given a fine of more than 50 yuan but expresses no objection to it.

The following procedures are applicable regarding other punishments for offenders against public order:

1. Summons. Public security organs shall summon offenders against public order and use subpoenas. An oral summons may be served on an offender against public order caught red-handed. Public security organs may serve compulsory summonses on offenders who reject or avoid the summonses without justifiable reasons.
2. Interrogation. Offenders against public order shall answer truthfully to the interrogation of public security organs. Notes shall be taken of the interrogation. After checking the notes and finding them to be correct, the interrogees shall sign or affix their chops to the notes. The interrogators shall also sign the notes.
3. Collecting evidence. The departments concerned and citizens shall actively support and assist public security organs in collecting evidence. Witnesses shall reflect matters as they are during interrogation, and notes shall be taken of the interrogation. After checking the notes and finding them to be correct, the witnesses shall sign or affix their chops to the notes.
4. Adjudication. Offenses against public order shall be adjudicated pursuant to the relevant provisions of these regulations after they have been verified through interrogation and investigation and the evidence has been found to be conclusive.

A verdict shall be filled out and pronounced immediately on the offender himself. The verdict shall be in triplicate, each copy of which shall be given to the person being adjudicated, the unit to which the person being adjudicated belongs, and the local police station in the place where the person being adjudicated has taken up permanent residence. The unit and the local police station in the place of permanent residence shall assist with enforcement of the verdict.

5. Public security organs shall conduct interrogation and investigation promptly after serving a summons on an offender against public order. The time of interrogation and investigation shall not exceed 24 hours in complicated cases in which detention is applicable pursuant to the provisions of these regulations.

Article 35. The person punished by detention shall go to the specified detention house during the prescribed time limit to accept the punishment. In case of resistance against enforcement, the punishment shall be enforced compulsorily.

The detainee shall pay for his own food during the period of detention.

Article 36. The person punished with a fine shall give the fine to public security personnel on the spot or deliver the money to the specified public security organ within 5 days of receiving the notification or the verdict. Failure to deliver the money by the time limit without justifiable reasons may result in an increase of the fine by 1 to 5 yuan per day. Those who refuse to pay the fine may be detained for not more than 15 days, and the fine shall still be enforced.

Public security organs or personnel shall issue receipts to the persons being fined upon receipt of the fines.

All the fines shall be delivered to the state treasury.

Article 37. In confiscating properties, adjudicating organs shall issue receipts to the persons whose properties are confiscated.

All the confiscated properties shall be delivered to the state treasury. Except for contraband, goods stolen, taken by force, or obtained through deception or extortion shall be returned to their owners after locating the owners within 6 months.

Article 38. Those adjudicated to compensate for losses or pay for medical expenses shall deliver the money to the adjudicating organs for forward delivery within 5 days of receiving the verdict. Payment can be made in installments if the amount involved is considerable. If payment is refused, the adjudicating organs shall notify the unit concerned to deduct wages or seize properties to satisfy payment.

Article 39. Those adjudicated for public offenses and the victims may file an appeal with the higher public security organs within 5 days of receiving the notification if they are not satisfied with the ruling of the public security organs or township (town) people's government. The higher public security organs shall render a ruling within 5 days of receiving the appeal. If found unsatisfactory, the ruling of the higher public security organs may be appealed to the local people's courts within 5 days of receiving the notification.

Article 40. The original ruling shall remain valid during the period of appellation and litigation if the appeal or lawsuit is filed in connection with the punishment for a public offense. The original ruling shall be suspended during the period of appellation and litigation if the person sentenced to detention or his family can find a guarantor or provide bail pursuant to relevant regulations. The bail shall be returned pursuant to relevant regulations when the ruling is rescinded or execution of the ruling begins.

Article 41. In enforcing these regulations, public security personnel shall strictly observe law and discipline, enforce law with fairness, and refrain from practicing favoritism or fraud. Beating, scolding, maltreating, and insulting offenders against public order are prohibited. Violators shall be given disciplinary sanctions. Criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law for those offenses that constitute crimes.

Article 42. In case of erroneous punishment of a citizen for a public offense, public security organs shall admit their mistake and return the fine and confiscated property to the person so punished. Compensation for losses shall be made if the legitimate rights of the person so punished have been infringed upon.

#### Chapter Five: Supplementary Articles

Article 43. "More than" or "not more than" a specified amount in reference to penalties or time limits in these regulations are inclusive.

Article 44. Measures for implementation in punishing offenses against traffic regulations shall be formulated separately by the State Council.

Article 45. These regulations shall take effect on 1 January 1987. The "Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order of the People's Republic of China" promulgated on 22 October 1957 shall be abolished at the same time.

/12858

CSO: 4005/007

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

REGULATIONS ON DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES

OW100843 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0126 GMT 6 Sep 86

[Text] Beijing, 6 Sep (XINHUA)--Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of the People's Republic of China

Adopted by the 17th Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th NPC on 5 September 1986:

Article 1. These regulations are formulated in order to affirm the diplomatic privileges and immunities of foreign diplomatic missions in China and their personnel and make it convenient for foreign diplomatic missions to perform their functions effectively on behalf of their nations.

Article 2. Mission diplomatic personnel should, in principle, be the nationals of the sending nation. Approval must be acquired from competent Chinese departments if Chinese or third-country nationals are assigned as diplomatic personnel. The competent Chinese departments may revoke this approval at any time.

Article 3. A diplomatic mission and its head are entitled to use the sending nation's flag or national emblem on the premise of the diplomatic mission and on the transportation vehicle on the mission head.

Article 4. The premises of a diplomatic mission are inviolable. Chinese government functionaries must have the approval of the diplomatic mission head or his agents in order to enter the premises of a diplomatic mission. Relevant Chinese departments shall take appropriate measures to protect the premises of diplomatic missions from being encroached upon or damaged.

The premises, facilities, and other properties of the diplomatic mission, as well as its vehicles, are exempt from search, requisition, impoundment, or enforcement.

Article 5. The premises of a diplomatic mission are exempt from taxation. However, this does not apply to charges for specified services provided to it.

Fixed fees and service charges collected by the diplomatic mission from its official business are exempt from taxation.

Article 6. The archives and documents of a diplomatic mission are inviolable.

Article 7. The personnel of a diplomatic mission enjoy freedom of movement and travel within the boundaries of China, except for forbidden or restricted areas designated by the Chinese government.

Article 8. A diplomatic mission may, for official business, freely correspond with the government of the sending nation, as well as other diplomatic missions and consulates of the sending nation. Correspondence can be carried out in all appropriate forms, including the use of diplomatic messengers, diplomatic pouch, and plain or secret code telegrams.

Article 9. Radio receivers and transmitters installed in a diplomatic mission for correspondence purposes must be approved by the Chinese government. The importation of such equipment shall be handled in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Chinese government.

Article 10. Incoming and outgoing official documents of a diplomatic mission are inviolable.

Diplomatic pouches shall be used only to carry diplomatic documents and articles for official use. They shall be sealed, with identification marks on the outside.

Article 11. A diplomatic messenger shall have a certificate of messenger issued by the competent department of the sending nation. A diplomatic messenger enjoys personal inviolability and cannot be arrested or detained.

A temporary diplomatic messenger must have a certificate of temporary messenger issued by the competent department of the sending nation. He enjoys the same immunities granted to diplomatic messengers during the period when he is responsible for carrying diplomatic pouches.

The captain of a commercial airplane may be entrusted to deliver diplomatic pouches. However, he must have official documents, issued by the country concerned, which clearly states how many diplomatic pouches he is delivering. The captain is not regarded as a diplomatic messenger. The diplomatic mission shall send mission personnel to collect the diplomatic pouches from the captain.

Article 12. Diplomatic representatives enjoy personal inviolability and cannot be arrested or detained. The relevant Chinese departments shall take appropriate measures to prevent the personal freedom and dignity of diplomatic representatives from being encroached upon.

Article 13. The residence of a diplomatic representative is inviolable and is under protection.

The documents and letters of a diplomatic representative are inviolable. The property of the diplomatic representative is inviolable, except for where the stipulations in Article 14 are applicable.

Article 14. A diplomatic representative is immune from criminal jurisdiction.

A diplomatic representative is immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction, with the following exceptions:

1. When he is engaged in an inheritance lawsuit in his private capacity;  
and
2. When he is engaged in a vocational or commercial lawsuit on other than his official business within the boundaries of China in violation of Article 25, Section 3.

A diplomatic representative is immune from enforcement. However, in cases where the preceding section are applicable, enforcement may be carried out if it does not constitute a violation of his person or residence.

A diplomatic representative is not obligated to testify as a witness.

Article 15. The administrative immunity of diplomatic representatives and personnel enjoying immunities in accordance with Article 20 may be renounced if the government of the sending nation makes a clear indication to this effect.

If diplomatic representatives or personnel enjoying immunities in accordance with Article 20 initiate a lawsuit they may not invoke administrative immunity with regard to counterclaims directly related to the lawsuit.

Renouncing civil or administrative immunity does not mean also renouncing immunity from the enforcement of the court decision. Another clear indication to this effect shall be made in order to renounce immunity from the enforcement of the court decision.

Article 16. A diplomatic representative is exempt from taxation. However, there are exceptions, as follows:

1. Taxes that are usually included in commodity prices or service charges;
2. Taxes related to inheritance. However, this is not applicable to a deceased diplomatic representative's movable property within the boundaries of China;
3. Taxes for private income originating within the boundaries of China;
4. Charges for specified services provided.

Article 17. A diplomatic representative is exempt from all personal and public labor service, as well as military service.

Article 18. Articles imported by a diplomatic mission for official use and articles imported by a diplomatic representative for personal use are exempt from customs duty and other taxation, in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Chinese government.

The personal luggage of diplomatic representatives is exempt from examination. However, it may be subject to examination when relevant Chinese departments have major reasons to suspect that the luggage contains articles not conforming to the preceding Article on taxation exemption, articles that are not allowed to be imported or exported by Chinese law, or articles subject to control in line with the quarantine law. The diplomatic representative or personnel authorized by him shall be present when the luggage is examined.

Article 19. Firearms and ammunition carried in by a diplomatic mission or mission personnel for their own use must subject to the approval of the Chinese government and handled pursuant to relevant regulations.

Article 20. A spouse and underage children living with a diplomatic representative enjoy the privileges and immunities stipulated in Articles 12 to 18, if they are not Chinese citizens.

A diplomatic mission's administrative and technical personnel and their spouses and underage children enjoy the privileges and immunities stipulated in Articles 12 to 17, if they are not Chinese citizens or permanent residents in China. However, their civil and administrative immunity is limited to their acts in conducting official business. The household articles imported by them within 6 months after they assume office at the mission are exempt from taxation pursuant to Section 1, Article 18.

Service personnel of a diplomatic mission enjoy immunity for their acts in conducting official business and the remuneration from their employment is exempt from income tax, if they are not Chinese citizens or permanent residents of China. Household articles imported by them within 6 months after they assume office are exempt from taxation pursuant to Section 1, Article 18.

The private attendants of diplomatic mission personnel are exempt from income tax for the remuneration from their employment if they are not Chinese citizens or permanent residents of China.

Article 21. In the case of diplomatic representatives being Chinese citizens or foreigners with permanent residence in China, their jurisdiction immunity and inviolability applies only to their acts in conducting official duty.

Article 22. The following personnel enjoy the necessary immunity and inviolability during stopovers or stays in China:

1. Diplomatic representatives stationed in a third country and spouses and children under age who are living with the representatives travelling through China;
2. Officials of a foreign country who come to China with Chinese diplomatic visas or diplomatic passports (only for countries which also waive visas for Chinese);
3. Other foreigners visiting China to whom the Chinese government grants the privileges and immunities stipulated in the present regulations;

Diplomatic messengers of a third country travelling through China and the diplomatic pouches they carry shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 and 11.

Article 23. The head of state, government leaders, foreign minister, and other officials of equivalent status of a foreign country shall enjoy privileges and immunities stipulated in the present regulations.

Article 24. Foreign representatives who come to China for international conferences convened by the United Nations or its special agencies, officials and experts of the United Nations and its special agencies who are temporarily in China, and representative offices and personnel of the United Nations and its special agencies shall be treated in accordance with the relevant international conventions signed by China and in accordance with the agreements signed between China and the relevant international organizations.

Article 25. Personnel enjoying diplomatic privileges and immunities:

1. Shall respect Chinese laws and decrees;
2. Shall not intervene in Chinese internal affairs;
3. Shall not engage in any professional or business activities for personal interest within Chinese boundaries; and
4. Shall not use the premises of the diplomatic mission or the residences of its working personnel for purposes incompatible with their diplomatic duties.

Article 26. In cases when diplomatic privileges and immunities granted by a foreign country to a Chinese diplomatic mission and mission personnel stationed in that country and to relevant Chinese personnel temporarily in that country are less than those granted by China to that country's diplomatic mission and mission personnel stationed in China and to its relevant personnel temporarily in China, the Chinese government may, in



accordance with the principle of reciprocity, accord only corresponding diplomatic prerogatives and immunity to that country's diplomatic mission, mission personnel stationed in China, and relevant personnel temporarily in China.

Article 27. In case of different stipulations in international treaties concluded or signed by China, the provisions of the international treaties shall apply. However, this does not include provisions to which China has declared reservations.

In case of different stipulations in diplomatic privileges and immunity agreements signed between China and foreign countries, the provisions of the agreements shall apply.

Article 28. The meaning of the following terms used in the present regulations is as follows:

1. "Head of a diplomatic mission" refers to the ambassador, minister, charge d'affairs, or other persons at the same level sent by a foreign country.
2. "Mission personnel" refers to the head of a diplomatic mission and the mission's working personnel.
3. "Mission's working personnel" refers to the diplomatic personnel, administrative and technical personnel, and service personnel of a diplomatic mission.
4. "Mission's diplomatic personnel" refers to the working personnel of a diplomatic mission who possess official titles.
5. "Diplomatic representatives" refers to the head of a diplomatic mission and the mission's diplomatic personnel.
6. "Mission's administrative and technical personnel" refers to the working personnel of a diplomatic mission engaged in administrative and technical work.
7. "Mission's service personnel" refers to the working personnel of a diplomatic mission engaged in service work.
8. "Private attendants" refers to personnel hired by the mission personnel personally.
9. "Premises of a diplomatic mission" refers to the buildings and the attached land used as the official residence of the head of a diplomatic mission.

Article 29. These regulations shall take effect beginning the date of promulgation.

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CSO: 4005/007

BRIEFS

SELF-TAUGHT STUDENTS' DEGREES--Beijing, 29 Aug (XINHUA)--Millions of Chinese have made progress toward college degrees by studying at home and passing national examinations. Some 11,400 of them have already earned college degrees through the examination system since the country began offering equivalency exams in 1981. In addition, 2.5 million certificates for passing the examinations of single subjects--the Chinese language and literature, english, law, etc.--have been issued. Among the major beneficiaries of the examination system are victims of the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976) who had no chance to obtain normal higher educations. [Excerpts] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1028 GMT 29 Aug 86 OW] /9738

USSR-U.S. TIES--Moscow, 13 Sep (XINHUA)--The Soviet Union and the United States "need each other as partners equally interested in mutual security," said Georgiy Arbatov today, the director of the Institute of the U.S. and Canadian Studies. Analyzing Soviet-U.S. relations in the Communist Party paper PRAVDA, Arbatov refuted Washington's view that the Soviet Union needed more than the United the normalization of relations, reconciliation, trade and summit meetings. Arbatov said the future of human beings in the nuclear era depends to a large extent on the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, thus determining the importance of the responsibilities of the two peoples and governments. It's high time for the U.S. Government to take practical actions, to embark on the road of peace and eliminate the nuclear threat, he said. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1422 GMT 13 Sep 86 OW] /9738

ENLARGED FOREIGN STUDENTS QUOTA--Beijing, 16 Sep (XINHUA)--China will accept 2,400 foreign students this year, 400 more than 1985, an official from the State Education Commission told XINHUA today. Counting graduate students, research scholars and those attending short-term training classes, the total number of foreigners currently studying in China has exceeded 20,000, he said. Since China resumed accepting foreign students in 1973, the number has been steadily increasing, he noted, especially after the country adopted its open-policy in 1979. Up to now, China has received foreign students from 114 countries who are studying in or have graduated from 70 Chinese universities and colleges in 17 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. China also plans to build or co-build schools abroad, he disclosed, adding that a China-funded technical school has already been established in the Yemen Arab Republic. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1119 GMT 16 Sep 86 OW] /9738

CSO: 4000/009

EAST REGION

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

SHANGHAI CPPCC STANDING COMMITTEE MEETS

OW141335 Shanghai City Service in Chinese 0000 GMT 12 Sep 86

[Excerpts] The Standing Committee of the Sixth Shanghai CPPCC Municipal Committee held its 18th meeting on 11 September. The meeting reviewed and approved a report on the work done in the past 4 months since the Fifth Session of the Sixth CPPCC Municipal Committee, and outlined the work plan until the first quarter of next year. Chairman Li Guohao presided over the meeting.

The meeting pointed out: In order to enhance understanding of the importance of spiritual civilization and political reform, the CPPCC Municipal Committee should organize its members to study, in the first quarter of next year, the resolutions to be adopted by the upcoming 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee, and especially conduct in-depth study and discussion of the role of the CPPCC and democratic parties in national political life.

The meeting decided that SHANGHAI ZHENGXIA BAO [Shanghai CPPCC News] be renamed LIANHE SHIBAO [United Times] starting January 1987.

The meeting heard reports by officials from the Municipal Planning Commission, the Municipal Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and the Municipal Finance Bureau respectively on the economic, foreign investment, and financial situation in Shanghai.

The meeting also approved personnel appointments and removals.

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CSO: 4005/007

EAST REGION

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ANHUI DISCIPLINE ORGANS URGED TO SUPPORT REFORM

OW051034 Hefei Anhui Provincial Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 3 Sep 86

[Station Commentary: "Discipline Inspection Organs Are Reformers' Backup Force"]

[Text] By investigating the charges reported in letters it received, the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Xuancheng Prefectural Party Committee, Anhui, has seriously handled a case in which a reformer was framed. This serves as a serious warning to those who attempt to use letters to confound black and white and achieve their despicable purposes. It also serves as a powerful backing to reformers.

People who dedicate themselves to reform are in need of the discipline inspection departments' protection and support. Since their reform activities encroach upon some people's vested interests, there certainly will be people who wish to trump up false charges against them and make every effort to subject them to criticism. Discipline inspection organs will create a good social and political environment for reform by verifying the accusations and dealing firmly with those people who act on heresay and fabricate false charges against innocent people.

As economic reform continues to develop, discipline inspection organs are duty bound to support reform and ensure its smooth progress. Discipline inspection organs not only must investigate and handle those people who take advantage of loopholes in reform and act against regulations, they must also investigate and handle those people who trump up false charges against reformers. This is to eliminate the obstacles standing in the way of reform. As for the mistakes committed by reformers in doing their work, discipline inspection organs should ardently help them learn their lessons so that reform can proceed soundly along the socialist course.

It is a glorious mission of discipline inspection departments to back up reformers!

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CSO: 4005/007

ANHUI GOVERNOR ADDRESSES JOURNALISM MEETING

OW141405 Hefei ANHUI RIBAO in Chinese 25 Aug 86 p 1

[By ANHUI RIBAO Reporter Yuan Yalin]

[Excerpts] The second council meeting of the Provincial Journalists' Association and the Provincial Society of Journalism was held in Hefei from 21 to 23 August.

The purpose of the meeting was to promote reform in journalism so that journalistic work in Anhui can better serve the building of socialist material and spiritual civilization.

Wang Yuzhao, deputy secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and governor of Anhui, spoke at the meeting. After discussing the importance of reform in journalism and ways of implementing it, he called on party committees at various levels to strengthen party leadership over journalistic work, and to respect the law of journalism and decisionmaking power of press units.

Ou Yuanfang, Standing Committee member of the Provincial Advisory Commission, Su Pingfan, deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the Provincial Party Committee, and Lu Desheng, vice chairman of the Provincial Federation of Societies of Social Sciences, also spoke at the meeting.

The meeting approved a work report by the previous Standing Council and the new constitution of the Provincial Journalists' Society and the Provincial Journalism Society, and elected 16 Standing Council members. Han Youshan [7281 6788 1472] was elected president, Liu Xing [0491 2502], Qian Lin [6929 2651], Li Guozhen [2621 0948 2823], Wang Likuang [3769 4409 6315], Da Ce [1129 4595], and Chen Sen [7115 2773] vice presidents, and Wang Chengli [3769 2052 4409] secretary general. Mao Fujun [0379 5397 0689] was retained as an adviser.

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CSO: 4005/007

EAST REGION

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ANHUI LEADERS ATTEND IDEOLOGICAL WORK CONFERENCE

OW150815 Hefei Anhui Provincial Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 11 Sep 86

[Excerpts] A provincial conference on ideological and political work in commercial departments closed in Hefei on 11 September. Participants in the conference studied the characteristics and methods of carrying out ideological and political work among workers and staff members of commercial departments in the course of reform. They also exchanged experience in improving commercial service. Some 500 personnel of civilized units, model workers, advanced workers, and outstanding ideological and political workers in commercial departments attended the conference.

Leaders of the Provincial Party Committee, Provincial Advisory Commission, Provincial People's Congress, Provincial Government, and CPPCC Provincial Committee Wang Yuzhao, Yuan Zhen, Wang Guangyu, Song Ming, and Meng Yigi, as well as officials of the Provincial Economic Commission, Provincial Trade Union Council, Provincial CYL Committee, and Provincial Women's Federation, attended the conference.

Vice Governor Song Ming spoke at the conference. He called on commercial departments throughout the province to thoroughly carry out structural reform, promote lateral ties in commodity circulation, try out new forms of commerce, explore new circulation channels, straighten out things in the wholesale trade system, invigorate enterprises, and enliven the market.

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CSO: 4005/007

EAST REGION

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

JIANGSU CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE MEETS

OWO40850 Nanjing Jiangsu Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 2 Sep 86

[Excerpts] The 21st session of the Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee opened in Nanjing on the morning of 2 September. According to the draft agenda, the meeting will study and discuss important documents of the central authorities on safeguarding the socialist legal system, examine the draft provincial regulations on management of water conservancy projects as well as the draft provincial measures for implementing the PRC Compulsory Education Law. The meeting will also hear and examine the provincial government's report on popularizing legal knowledge and on the implementation of the Food Hygiene Law, and discuss personnel appointments and dismissals.

Chairman Chu Jaing presided over the morning plenary session, and delivered a speech on studying the important documents of the central authorities on safeguarding the socialist legal system.

Attending the meeting were Li Qingkui, Wang Bingshi, and Hong Peilin, vice chairmen of the Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee. Ling Qihong, vice governor, and responsible persons of the Provincial Higher People's Court, the Provincial People's Procuratorate, departments concerned of the provincial government, and the standing committees of the people's congresses of 11 cities attended the meeting as observers.

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CSO: 4005/007

## SHANDONG CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING ENDS

SK100529 Jinan Shandong Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 9 Sep 86

[Excerpts] The 21st Standing Committee meeting of the Provincial People's Congress concluded on 9 September. That morning the meeting held a plenary session, at which the participating members unanimously approved the province's methods for implementing the PRC's law on compulsory education and the province's several provisions on protecting the legitimate rights and interests of women and children.

The methods adopted by the province for implementing the state law on compulsory education are to enforce the 9-year compulsory education in 1990 among the children of 6 years of age throughout the province.

At the plenary session, the participants also approved some personnel changes.

At the meeting the participants earnestly discussed the reports concerning the achievements scored by the province in implementing the temporary provisions on comprehensive development in the urban construction program and in conducting reformatory work through labor and the work of helping the poor.

During their discussion, the participants expressed their satisfaction with the achievements scored by the province in implementing the temporary provisions on comprehensive development in the urban construction program and put forward their opinions on paying attention to occupying less farmland and avoiding pollution in conducting comprehensive development.

During the meeting, the participating members unanimously held that our province has made a new breakthrough in giving a helping hand to the poor over the past few years. The success made in this regard is mainly because of the leading personnel who have taken the lead in the work, gone deep into the poor areas to carry out their official work, and done practical deeds in these areas in developing production in line with the discovered objective situation.



During their discussion, the participating members fully acknowledged the marked achievements scored by the province in conducting the reformatory work through labor. They pointed out that the reformatory work through labor done by the province ranks first in the country and that the broad masses of public security cadres and policemen on this front have industriously devoted to the work, thus they deserve society's praise.

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CSO: 4005/007

## BRIEFS

ANHUI LEADERS VIEW EXHIBIT--An exhibition of paintings and calligraphy by teachers, organized by ANHUI JIAOYU ZAZHISHE [Educational Magazine of Anhui] to mark Teachers' Day, opened today. A continuous stream of visitors came to view the exhibition, which was held at the Anhui gallery. Provincial party and government leaders including Wang Yuzhao, Yuan Zhen, Xu Leyi, and Wang Houhong; (Su Qinfan), deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the provincial party committee; and (Lu Qingju), chairman of the provincial educational commission, viewed the exhibition with great interest. [Excerpts] [Hefei Anhui Provincial Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 10 Sep 86] /9604

PAPER STRESSES PARTY RECTIFICATION--XINHUA RIBAO frontpages a report on 14 September on party rectification in Taixing County and its impact on the development of township and town enterprises in the county. The newspaper publishes a commentator's article on the report. The article says: Party rectification among township and town enterprises in Jiangsu has entered the phase of comparison and examination. This is a critical period in party rectification, and we must work vigorously to ensure the success of party rectification and to promote reform and the sound development of township and town enterprises. [Excerpts] [Nanjing Jiangsu Provincial Service in Mandarin 2300 GMT 13 Sep 86 OW] /12858

CSO: 4005/007

## BEIJING OFFICIAL ON CURRENT SITUATION AT CPPCC MEETING

SK050437 Beijing BEIJING RIBAO in Chinese 26 Aug 86 p 1

[Text] The municipal CPPCC Committee held its 38th Standing Committee meeting on 25 August.

Comrade Gao Ge presided over the meeting. He, first of all, invited Vice Mayor Han Boqing to report on the current situation and tasks of Beijing. Vice Mayor Han Boping said in his brief report: In the first half of this year, municipal industrial production increased continuously; the scale of capital construction was brought under control; the quality of projects completed was improved; the construction area of the basic municipal installations, which facilitated the people's livelihood, expanded; the investment in building cultural, educational, and public health facilities increased by 13.6 percent over the corresponding period of last year; the growth rate of consumption funds was relatively normal; the wage increase was equal to last year's figure; the price index dropped month after month in proportion; people's living standards improved continuously, with the urban rural savings deposits during the first half of this year increasing by 1.2 billion yuan; a good harvest of summer grain was reaped and the autumn grain was doing well, which is expected to surpass the best past record; and the supply of vegetables and non-staple foods was ampler than that in the past several years. In addition, the municipal government's preparing to adopt measures to better satisfy the people's demands for fresh meat and milk. In his brief report, Vice Mayor Han Boping also pointed out some problems in economic work. For instance, there are still some unstable factors in economic work; reserve of some materials has increased; production and marketing of industrial products have not been coordinated; the consumption structure has not been rational enough; and the industrial production structure needs readjustment. Vice Mayor Han Boping sincerely hoped that CPPCC members will collect opinions and offer suggestions for improving the work of Beijing Municipality.

At the meeting, Li Tianshou, secretary general of the municipal CPPCC Committee, made a report on the work of the municipal CPPCC Committee over the past 3 months.

The Standing Committee of the municipal CPPCC Committee also adopted, through consultations, the namelist of the additional vice chairmen of the general office of the municipal CPPCC Committee and the namelists of the additional chairmen, vice chairmen and section chiefs of the study commission and two other commissions under the municipal CPPCC Committee.

Bai Jiefu, chairman of the municipal CPPCC Committee, attended and addressed the meeting. Attending the meeting were vice chairmen of the municipal CPPCC Committee including Guan Shixiong, Su Congzhou, Lu Zongda, Deng Jixing, Li Chen, Ding Gongnan, Kan Guangqing, and Gan Ying.

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CSO: 4005/018

REPORTAGE ON TIANJIN'S 29TH CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING

Meeting Opens

SK090340 Tianjin TIANJIN RIBAO in Chinese 26 Aug 86 p 1

[Excerpts] The 29th Standing Committee meeting of the municipal People's Congress opened in the conference room of the Standing Committee on 25 August.

The meeting first approved the agenda that consists of discussing the municipal "provisions" (draft) concerning management over household-run industrial and commercial enterprises, the municipal "provisions" (draft) concerning the protection of the legal rights and interests of household-run enterprises in the rural areas and the enhancement of management over rural household-run enterprises; hearing a report on preparatory work for enforcing the "PRC law" on mineral sources; discussing the work of electing next-term deputies at the district, county, township, and town levels, and the motion on revising the "detailed rules and regulations" of electing deputies at or below the district-county level; and of approving some personnel changes.

The meeting was presided over by Li Zhongyuan, vice chairman of the municipal People's Congress Standing Committee.

Attending the meeting were Zhang Zaiwang, chairman of the municipal People's Congress Standing Committee; and Bai Hua, Liu Zengkun, Xu Ming, Yang Jianbai, Fan Quan, Han Tianyao, Yu Fujing, and Shi Jian, vice chairmen of the municipal People's Congress Standing Committee.

Attending the meeting as observers were Wang Yongchen, president of the municipal Higher People's Court; Jiao Li, deputy chief procurator of the municipal People's Procuratorate; and responsible persons from the departments concerned under the municipal People's Congress Standing Committee, the municipal People's Government, and the municipal CPPCC Committee.

### Meeting Concludes

SK090350 Tianjin TIANJIN RIBAO in Chinese 29 Sep 86 p 1

[Text] The 29th Standing Committee meeting of the municipal People's Congress concluded on 28 August.

The meeting again examined and discussed the revised municipal "provisions" (draft) concerning the protection of the legal rights and interests of household-run industrial and commercial enterprises and the enhancement of management over these household-run enterprises, and the municipal "provisions" (draft) concerning the protection of the legal rights and interests of rural household-run enterprises and the enhancement of management over these rural enterprises. The meeting also adopted two corresponding resolutions on these provisions.

The meeting examined and approved the matter of electing next-term deputies at the levels of district, county, township, and town; and the motion on revising the "detailed rules and regulations" of electing deputies at or below the district-county level.

The meeting also approved some personnel changes.

Zhang Zaiwang, chairman of the municipal People's Congress Standing Committee, presided over the meeting. Attending yesterday's meeting were vice chairmen of the municipal People's Congress Standing Committee, including Bai Hua, Li Zhongyuan, Liu Zengkun, Xu Ming, Yang Jianbai, Fan Quan, Han Tianyao, and Yu Fujing.

Attending yesterday's meeting as observers were Wang Yongchen, president of the municipal Higher People's Court; Jiao Li, deputy chief procurator of the Municipal People's Procuratorate; and responsible persons from departments concerned.

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## NEI MONGGOL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING

## Meeting Convenes

SK300130 Hohhot Nei Monggol Regional Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 29 Aug 86

[Excerpts] The 18th Standing Committee meeting of the 6th regional People's Congress opened in Hohhot on the morning of 29 August. The agenda of the meeting is to hear and discuss a report of the autonomous regional Audit Bureau on auditing work of the region, and a report of the autonomous agriculture committee on implementation of the Nei Monggol Autonomous Regional Regulations on Forest Management for Trial Use, to discuss a report on the proposal for opening livestock insurance business in the pastoral areas, and to appoint and remove personnel.

Buetegeqi, vice chairman of the regional People's Congress Standing Committee, presided over the meeting and gave a brief explanation of the items of the agenda. Buetegeqi said: It is hoped that through our hearing and discussing the report on auditing work in Nei Monggol, auditing work will be promoted and will better serve economic structural reform, and planned auditing and supervision over financial and economic management in a selective way and according to law will be realized step by step with the focus on the central task of economic work.

Zhou Beifeng, Seyinbayaer, and Alatanaoqier, vice chairmen of regional People's Congress Standing Committee, attended the meeting. Attending as nonvoting delegates were Bai Junqing, vice chairman of the region; Wang Linzhong, chief procurator of the regional People's Procuratorate; and responsible persons of the regional Higher People's court.

## Meeting Concludes

SK040405 Hohhot Nei Monggol Regional Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 3 Sep 86

[Excerpts] After successfully fulfilling all agenda items, the 18th Standing Committee meeting of the 6th regional People's Congress ended today.

This meeting heard and discussed a report of the autonomous regional Audit Bureau on the region's auditing work and a report of the regional agricultural committee on implementation of the Nei Monggol Autonomous Regional

Regulations on Forest Management for Trial Use, discussed a report on the proposal for opening livestock insurance business in the pastoral areas, and adopted a decision on the appointment and removal of personnel of the state organs.

This afternoon's meeting was presided over by Seyinbauaer, vice chairman of the regional People's Congress Standing Committee.

While discussing the report on the autonomous region's auditing work, the committee members fully affirmed the work achievements of the regional audit organ since its establishment 2 years ago, and pointed out the favorable conditions for further carrying out auditing work. They held that to supervise auditing work in the course of the four modernizations is a long-term and arduous task. The autonomous region has just made its first step to supervise the auditing work. On the one hand, all departments should create favorable conditions and a good environment for auditing work, and on the other, the audit departments and bureaus should be bold and active to carry out and supervise auditing work in a planned manner and with emphasis on certain points, to make a breakthrough in the work, and to expand the scope of work, thus enabling the autonomous region's auditing work to better serve the regional economic structural reform and economic construction.

Batubagen, chairman of the regional People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhou Beifeng, Alatanaoqier, and Hu Zhongda, vice chairmen of the regional People's Congress Standing Committee, attended the meeting.

Wang Linzhong, chief procurator of the regional People's Procuratorate, and the responsible persons of the regional Higher People's Court attended the meeting as observers.

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## SHANXI GOVERNOR ON LABOR SYSTEM REFORMS

HK121308 Taiyuan Shanxi Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 11 Sep 86

[Text] Recently the provincial government held a conference on reform of the province's labor system to implement the four provisional regulations formulated by the State Council, namely, instituting the employment contract system in state-run enterprises; reforming the recruiting system, dismissing staff and workers who violate labor discipline; and insurance for the unemployed. At the conference, the participants discussed detailed rules for implementing the four regulations in the province, and arranged work concerning reform of the province's labor system.

Governor Wang Senhao attended the conference and delivered a speech. He said that the crux of the four provisional regulations formulated by the State Council is reform of the recruitment and employment system. Namely, abolishing the system whereby retired workers are replaced by their sons or daughters, abolishing the method of recruiting sons or daughters of staff and workers from within an enterprise; and instituting the system of recruiting staffs and workers through public examinations and giving priority to those with better qualifications and results. In the future, when recruiting new workers, including recruiting workers to replace old ones, state-run enterprises, state organs, institutions, and mass organizations must institute the employment contract system. Enterprises must have the power to dismiss staff and workers who violate discipline. Enterprises may dismiss, according to the relevant regulations, those who seriously violate labor discipline and refuse to mend their ways after being given repeated admonitions and administrative punishment and yet whose offenses are not serious enough to warrant dismissal. Social insurance must be granted to the unemployed to ensure their livelihood.

Governor Wang Senhao stressed that party committees and governments at all levels must fully understand the importance of the current reform of the labor system; put labor reform high on their agenda; treat it as an important task in the last 4 months of this year; and grasp it firmly and effectively. It is necessary to conduct thoroughgoing and painstaking ideological and political work in connection with ideological problems

among staff and workers. We must conduct propaganda and education work to ensure that people truly understand the nature of the labor contract system; the problems of retired workers being replaced by their sons or daughters; recruiting sons or daughters of staff and workers from within an enterprise. We must make them realize that allowing enterprises to dismiss staff and workers who violate discipline serves to enforce labor discipline, to maintain a normal order of production and work, and to protect the interests of staff and workers.

At the conference, the participants seriously discussed and studied the specific rules and measures formulated by the province for implementing the four regulations of the State Council. After approval, these rules and measures will be implemented throughout the province.

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## BRIEFS

CEREMONY FOR DECEASED OFFICIAL--The ash-laying ceremony for Comrade (Yun Beifeng), an outstanding member of the Communist Party of China, a faithful communist fighter, a worthy son of the Monggol nationality, and secretary general of the NPC Nationalities Committee, was ceremoniously held at the auditorium of the Daqingshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Hohhot this morning. Peng Zhen, Ulanhu, Xi Zhongxun, Hu Qiaomu, Chen Pixian, Wei Guoqing, and Deng Liqun, as well as the central organs, Nei Monggol Autonomous regional leading organs, and other relevant departments sent wreaths. The ash-laying ceremony for Comrade (Yun Beifeng) was presided over by Comrade Batubagen. Comrade Seyinbayaer gave an account of Comrade (Yun Beifeng's) life history. [Excerpts] [Hohhot Nei Monggol Regional Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 6 Sep 86] /9604

HEBEI PERSONNEL CHANGES--On 24 and 29 July, and 8 August, the Hebei Provincial People's Government decided to appoint Bai Yulan [2672 3768 5695] as vice chairman of the Hebei Provincial Family Planning Committee; to appoint Zhao Ruitang [6392 3843 1016] as president of the Hebei Agro-technical Normal Institute; to remove Mao Zhijun [3029 1807 0689] from the posts of deputy secretary general of the Hebei Provincial People's Government and deputy director of the Hebei Provincial Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Department; and to remove Zhang Pu [1728 5455] as deputy director of the Hebei Provincial Civil Affairs Department. [Text] [Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 24 Aug 86 p 3] /9604

CSO: 4005/018

## MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

### COMMENTARY ON CURRENT PLA REFORMS

Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese Vol 20  
No 8, 15 Aug 86 pp 72-82

[Article by Tung I [5516 2496]: "Commentary on Several Current Reforms in the Communist Army"]

#### [Text] I. Foreword

For a long time the Chinese communists' army chieftains have called for "reorganization reforms" of the armed forces, but because of serious factionalism within the communist army, there has been one obstruction after another. In the end, the so-called "reorganization reforms" have been merely a certain new arrangement of important personnel. Their essential significance is only to create conditions for those in power to preserve and consolidate their power. The practice of Deng Xiaoping since he returned to power has been no exception. In 1979, the Chinese communists suffered a defeat in their war against Vietnam. In addition, they put the open-door policy into practice, and came to understand the current situation in the establishment and equipment systems of foreign armies. They deeply felt that the backward situation of the communist army, which had existed for a long time, was unsuitable, and so they began to make efforts to spur the pace of "reforms." The reforms began to take shape after the "enlarged session of the Central Military Commission" of the CPC in June of last year (1985). Except for the system of "party leadership over the army," which did not change in the slightest, fairly big "reforms" were made in other aspects, like the operational command system and the education and training system as well as the war preparedness mobilization system and logistics work. Among them there still exist many problems which are worthy of analysis and inquiry.

#### II. Intention To Readjust the Operational Command System

In June 1985, at the same time that it announced a 1-million man reduction in military personnel, the communist army readjusted the operational control areas of its "military regions." The "Fuzhou Military Region" was dissolved and incorporated into the "Nanjing Military Region." The "Wuhan Military Region" was dissolved. Its "Henan Provincial Military District" was incorporated into the "Jinan Military Region" and its "Hubei Provincial Military District" was incorporated into the "Guangzhou Military Region." The

"Kunming Military Region" was dissolved and incorporated into the Chengdu Military Region." The "Urumqi Military Region" fell to provincial-level military district status. Its name was changed to "Xinjiang Military District," and it was put under the jurisdiction of the "Lanzhou Military Region." By this readjustment, except for the "large military regions" of "Beijing" and "Shenyang" the depth of defensive operations and the breadth of the defensive frontage of all presently existing "large military regions" were increased. In future interior operations, they will have much room for maneuver, which will be advantageous for the mobile use of the forces in their subordinate districts. They will have fairly much time to block a hypothetical enemy who launches a large in-depth offensive action, which will be advantageous for transferring mobile strike units in non-combat zones to reinforce the battle. The original 11 "large military regions" have been reconstituted into 9 "large military regions." The reduction in the number of "large military regions" makes them easier to handle under the operational command of the CPC's "Central Military Commission," which is the "supreme command" of the communist army. However, after the dissolution of the "Wuhan Military Region," there is a lack of a comprehensive strategic reserve. In the pattern of traditional warfare, this operational deployment should not be suitable, and its success or failure awaits test and verification in actual combat in the future. If the Chinese communists lack a strategic reserve in actual combat in the future, and replace it with strategic nuclear weapons, this will change the nature of the war. For the Chinese communists, this would obviously be disadvantageous.

Three years ago the CPC's "Central Military Commission" made a decision to reconstitute "field armies" into "group armies," blending various service arms into combined arms forces. In the past stage progress in this respect was slow. After June of last year (1985), this reconstitution was speeded up, and at the end of 1985 the Chinese communists announced that it had been completed. After the formation of "group armies" was completed, He Qizong [0149 0366 1350], deputy chief of staff of the communist army, publicly pointed out: "The reconstituting of field armies into 'group armies' was a major result of our army's reform of its establishment system. It indicates that our army has entered a new stage of modernization." He stressed that "after the reconstitution of the units will further improve their weapons and equipment, raise the degree of their combined arms, and strengthen their capability for fast reaction; and the units' establishment system will also be more appropriate." He also said: "The enhanced combining of all service arms, and the consequent questions of how to display the fighting power of the whole and how to strengthen unified command impose higher demands on the quality of commanders, increase the difficulty of training organization, and also raise a series of new problems for the units in political and ideological work and in logistics support work." (1) (Chinese communists' XINHUA News Agency, Peiping dispatch, 31 December 1985)

The abovementioned words of He Qizong show that although the formation of "group armies" in the communist army has been completed, "raising the degree of combined arms and making the establishment system more appropriate," this is only the phenomena on the surface, and the more important "unified command and organization of training" by commanders as well as their quality cannot

match it. For the responsible cadres in these "group armies" of the communist army, combined arms training is something new. The cadres selected to be the commanders of the "group armies" were well-tempered in the 10 years of the "Cultural Revolution," and their level of academic knowledge is obviously low. Therefore, after the formation of all the "group armies" in the communist army, so far there has been no campaign or tactical training of combined arms forces, and this situation has forced the communist army to set up a "Combined Arms Tactical Training Center" with specific responsibilities in the "Nanjing Military Region" (2) (XINHUA News Agency, 22 April 1986 Nanjing dispatch) in order that all the "group armies" could go in turn to this center and get tactical training. As for training in campaign operations, a fairly long time of planning and preparation is obviously still required. In the present situation, because the "group armies" lack proper combined arms training and their personnel and equipment cannot display their proper united role, their fighting power is weak.

The communist army's "group armies" are combined arms units, and when they were formed the process involved the reconstitution of the communist army's special arms units. The former independent artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and armored arms were changed from the division and regiment level to the brigade and battalion level and incorporated into the "group army's" system of organization. Other arms, like the signal, engineer, and antichemical warfare, were put under the command of "group armies" at the regiment- and battalion-level system of organization. At the command stratum, the "group army" still corresponds to a field "army"-level unit. Because the special arms were put in the "group army's" system of organization, the entire operational command system tends to be more convenient than in the past. According to a report in the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, in May of this year the communist army set up a "command automation work center" in Peiping, showing that in its operational command system the communist army is trying to move forward in the direction of "automation." This report stressed that "command automation work centers will be set up in succession at all levels, and the automation of organization command and office work at all levels in the army can be expected to be completed in the period of the "Seventh 5-Year Plan." (3) (Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO [LIBERATION ARMY DAILY--LAD] 9 May 1986 report) Besides this news reported in the Chinese communists' army newspaper, the Chinese communists' Radio Fujian pointed out: "This work station is responsible for the tasks of sentry duty and protection of the automated command networks at all levels in the army, and for technical support for command and office work automation in headquarters organizations." (4) (Chinese communists' Fujian Radio Station broadcast 20 May 1986) These reports reflect the communist army's exaggerated propaganda about this success. However it remains doubtful whether the command personnel at all levels in the communist army will have the degree of skill needed for this type of technology as well as be able to effectively coordinate it with actual operational command.

### III. Changes in Education and Training System

As early as 1977, Deng Xiaoping said that the communist army's education and training must be raised to a "strategic position." Afterward, the communist army took certain measures for "reform" in this field, but they were still in

the "small" category. Only after the "enlarged session of the Central Military Commission" in June of last year (1985) was a determined push given to the "reform" movement. In October of the same year, the Chinese communists' "General Staff Department" held an "all-army conference on training." The conference stressed that from now on training must adapt to the strategic change in the guiding idea behind the building of the communist army, and that prominence must be given to "reforms" during the new year's training. It also called for the development and stockpiling of talented persons for building the communist army and for preparing against war through the two channels of academy training and unit training. (5) (LAD 24 October 1985 report) Therefore, the communist army took the following measures in academy education and unit training.

#### A. Reorganization of the Academy Education System

1. First, the communist army's "Military Academy," "Political Academy," and "Logistics Academy" were merged into the "National Defense University." In answering reporters' questions, Zhang Zhen [1728 7201], commandant, and Li Desheng [2621 1795 3932], political commissar, of the "National Defense University," said: "The establishment of the National Defense University was an important decision based on the new situation and tasks." They also said: "At present a new technological revolution is rising on a worldwide scale, and military science and technology are changing with each passing day. There already have been and there will continue to be a series of major changes in strategy and tactics. Modern warfare requires that the high-level commanders of our army be 'very knowledgeable and very capable,' and become all-around talents with strategic minds and the capability for commanding combined arms operations, and who are able to command comprehensively military, political, and logistics work. The leading cadres of the state's relevant departments also must possess knowledge about national defense modernization. Our army's training system for high-level cadres must adapt to the demands of this new situation." (6) (XINHUA News Agency, 18 December 1986 Peiping dispatch) Also, according to what has been disclosed, the mission of the communist army's "National Defense University" is "to train military, political, and logistics command cadres at the army level and above, high-level staff personnel, and high-level theoretical research personnel of the communist army's Army, Navy, and Air Force; and leading cadres of the state's relevant departments. Its mission is also to do research on relevant questions of strategy and questions of national defense modernization in order to play an advisory role in the policy decision-making of the Military Commission and the General Headquarters." The university has decided to enroll students in the summer vacation time and to begin its first term on 1 September. (7) (Ibid (6))

2. An "all-army academy conference" was held to discuss the question of "reforming" education in the armed forces' academies. In February of this year, the communist army held its 10-day 13th "all-army academy conference," at which Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807], director of the communist army's General Staff Department, declared: "The strategic change in the education in armed forces' academies truly switches the guiding idea behind the running of academies in the direction of orienting towards modernization, the world, and the future, developing the talents needed now, and what is more making good



preparations in talents for the building and development of the army in the nineties to the early years of the next century." (8) (Chinese communists' RENMIN RIBAO 27 February 1986 report) Yu Qiuli [0151 4428 6849], director of the communist army's "General Political Department," also spoke at the conference. He stressed that "the fundamental aim in strengthening the building of the armed forces' academies is to improve the army's quality and develop talented persons with good military and political quality. The political quality of the cadres is primary and fundamental." He also said: "The reason we emphasize attaching importance to the political quality of the students is, in accordance with the party's consistent policy, to uphold the unity of red and expert by developing in a comprehensive manner talented persons morally, intellectually, and physically. We do not only stress politics, and not stress other things; we also do not indulge in empty talk about politics separate from military affairs and specialized skills." (9) (XINHUA News Agency 26 February 1986 Peiping dispatch) After Yu Qiuli's speech was released by the Chinese communists' XINHUA News Agency, the 27 February RENMIN RIBAO's report of it deleted the sentence "the political quality of the cadres is primary and fundamental." The main reason for the deletion was that this sentence puts "red" ahead of "expert" and conflicts with the cadre policy currently boosted by the communist army of making cadres "professionally more competent" and "better educated." From this it is not difficult to see that the struggle of contradiction between "red" and "expert," between "revolutionization" and "modernization," which has existed for a long time in the Chinese communists' armed forces, has not died down or slowed down because of any "shift in strategy" or "reform and streamlining." Li Peng [2621 7720], vice premier of the Chinese communists' "State Council," also spoke at the conference in his capacity as the minister in charge of the "State Education Commission." He said that the "armed forces" academies must persist in the direction of reform, courageously explore, and take the new path of developing military education that conforms to the national condition and possesses our army's special features." (10) (XINHUA News Agency 25 February 1986 Peiping dispatch) In fact, the great majority of our 1 billion compatriots on the mainland love peace, and the pursuit of "violent revolution" by the communist army is a case of "trying to go south by driving the chariot north"--acting in a way that defeats one's purpose--and of running in the opposite direction. The Chinese communists are not at all qualified to speak about any "national condition," so how can they explore any new path?!

3. In May of this year, the CPC's "Military Commission" made the decision to "reform the education in the armed forces' academies." According to what has been revealed, the focus of its "reform" is to arrange the system smoothly; perfect the three-level--primary, middle, and high--training system of command academies; and perfect the two types--middle- and high-level--of special technical academies and their faculty structure." The main points are:

a. Readjustment of the training administrative levels for commanding officers. The primary-level command academies will emphasize education in military affairs, politics, and basic culture, emphasizing the training of commanding officers for platoon posts. The middle-level command academies will provide education of an advanced nature, emphasizing the training of commanding officers for regimental posts. The high-level command academies will provide



comprehensive education at the highest level, emphasizing the training of high-level commanding officers.

b. Perfection of the system for training officers in special skills, with the focus on developing talented persons at the technical secondary school and college levels.

c. Test-running of a number of academies of a comprehensive nature, in which there is joint training of military, political, and logistics commanding officers. In them there is joint training of officers in command management and techniques to strengthen the officers' ability to adapt to changed work posts.

d. Graded development of education for graduate students, mainly developing high-level teachers, scientific researchers, and specialized technicians. As much as possible this is to be integrated with the training of officers for taking on new posts. The academies will also, by various ways such as correspondence school education, create conditions for in-service study by officers.

e. Planned preparation for establishing training organizations for noncommissioned officers.

The "decision" also said that the armed forces' academies must put the open-door policy in effect in running the academies. There is to be widespread interchange and coordination among the armed forces' academies and between them and local schools. With the approval of the CPC's "Military Commission," there will be established relations of friendly intercourse by the "open-door" academies with the academies of foreign armies. (11) (XINHUA News Agency 19 June 1986 Peiping dispatch)

4. A number of newly established "new-type" academies. Based on disclosures by the Chinese communists, during the "reform of its system" the communist army has established a number of "new-type" academies, which are now enrolling students and will start their terms on 1 September. According to reports, there are several dozen of these "new-type" academies, including the "Army Command Academy," "Military Education Academy," "Military Economics Academy," and "Information Engineering Academy." Also, the communist army has established the first batch of "noncommissioned officer schools," and two of them are being run on a trial basis this year. In 42 "officer schools" noncommissioned officer classes will be run on a trial basis, and will mainly enroll and train noncommissioned officers to be company quartermasters, radio station chiefs, and technicians. The communist army also says that this is a major "reform" of the armed forces' academy systems. (12) (Ibid (11))

In January of this year, the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO reported, "The streamlining and reorganization of the army's academies, the people's armed forces departments, and the logistics support system, which began this year, is expected to be completed by the end of the year." (13) (LAD 1 January 1986 report) At the end of June this year, the Chinese communists' XINHUA News Agency reported: "The streamlining and reorganization of the academies is preceeding smoothly. Based on the Central Military Commission's decision,

readjustments have been made in the academy system. Some academies have been deactivated and merged, and personnel have been trained to a high degree of proficiency. In the entire army, 12 percent of the number of academies have been cut and more than 20 percent of the number of personnel have been cut." (14) (XINHUA News Agency 28 June 1986 Peiping dispatch, and Chinese communists' Central Radio Station 30 June 1986 broadcast) From a look at available data, the number of academies and personnel in the communist army has been cut. Actually we only see that the communist army has merged three academies--the military, political, and logistics academies--into the "National Defense University" and has established several dozen "new-type" academies. Under the circumstances in which the communist army is vigorously training cadres, taking academic research seriously, and elevating the knowledge and ability of cadres with specialized skills, even if it is possible to streamline the academies there are difficulties in cutting the number of personnel. I judge that the reason for the abovementioned reported cutting of the number of academies and personnel was to meet the requirements for "streamlining and organization." Under the premise of "streamlining and reorganization" they can only make such reports. To provide the teaching personnel needed for the reorganization of the military academies, it is possible that there will be a cut in the first half of this year and then an addition in the second half of it, and the number to be added cannot be publicly reported in the years of "streamlining and organization." The fact that the communist army has added "new-type" academies and some specialized technical academies, and also that it is setting up a "noncommissioned officer system," shows that it is forging ahead along the path of cadre "specialization." However, the establishment of this type of academy entails its possession of the related excellent teachers. This is the principal difficult problem for this type of specialized and higher academy, and is also the key to whether the academy educators of the future will be able to be really effective. Under the current circumstances in which the knowledge and ability of the ordinary cadre lags behind, it should be the most difficult problem for the communist army's academy education.

#### B. Continuing "Reform" of Unit Training

The "reform" of the training of the communist army's units has been going on for a year. To promote training reform, cadres at all levels in the communist army have, under the strong pressure of the idea that "reform is revolution," used their brains and done a lot of thinking. No matter whether in training plans, training reforms, or training content, they have striven for novelty and change, so that there is the joke that the first, second, and third items in the original training outline have been reversed to the third, second, and first items and called "pioneering work in reform." Afterward, there appeared many unhealthy trends and evil practices or practicing fraud and deception and of "writing superficial articles." Therefore, in the communist army's training "reforms," in these years it has not yet been possible to come up with a set of specific, effective models and standards. The "all-army military training conference," which the Chinese communists held in October of last year, stressed that "in next year's training prominence must be given to reforms," ignoring the question of whether the communist army could make any breakthroughs in training reform this year. However, since the "all-army

military training conference" some different types of changes in the communist army's unit training practices have been discovered.

1. The formation of "recruit coaching regiments" in army units: Yang Dezhi, the communist army's chief of staff, once said: "The coaching regiment is something new," "the formation of the coaching regiment is a major reform in our army's training system." It first began as an experiment by a certain division in the Chinese communists' "Nanjing Military Region," after which all "group armies" in succession formed "recruit coaching regiments," and at the same time began to give concentrated training to recruits who joined the army at the end of last year (1985). According to a disclosure by the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO: "After the establishment of recruit coaching regiments, the past situation in which the army units' operational system and training system were joined into one was changed; and the situation in which every year, after the recruits joined the army, the units' training could only start with the individual soldier, the veteran soldiers year after year were tied to the recruits' '1-year level,' and the units' training always went in cycles at a low-level stage, was changed. The formation of recruit coaching regiments has separated the recruit training from the units' training as a whole, and the starting point in the training of operational units can be raised." (15) (LAD 31 October 1985 report) This was the first idea, but in the first session of recruit training, the division, through tracking and investigating the education and training of the recruits, discovered that some of the training equipment and materials of the "coaching regiment" were inferior to those existing in the units, and that, after the recruits were put into the units, they had to be trained with the units' new equipment, a situation which adversely affected the progress and results of the units' training as a whole. (16) (LAD 20 May 1986 report)

For the tasks of the communist army's "recruit coaching regiments," when the regiment of the "Nanjing Military Region" was conducting its experiment, three tasks were set forth--training recruits, training backbone elements, and training technical talents for civilian use. However, after the 4-month first stage of recruit training, the communist army defined the tasks of the coaching regiments as: In practice, concentrate on training recruits and preselected squad leaders. In wartime, prepare to carry out operational missions. (17) (LAD 17 April 1986 report) It is not known whether, after many reviews of the training in the future, there will be any changes in their tasks.

With regard to the results of the first stage of recruit training in the "recruit coaching regiments," the communist army once held an "all-army on-the-spot meeting on coaching regiments," (18) (LAD 26 April 1986 report) which made an on-the-spot check on the degree of recruit training. Reviewing the many problems that still exist, some army cadres have misgivings about this kind of training. Because of the uneven quality of the cadres at all levels in the "coaching regiments," there exists a big gap in their conditions and those of the operational units. In particular, the unhealthy tendency of cadres in "coaching regiments" to openly want money, goods, and presents from the recruits has a serious adverse effect on the recruits' training results. According to a report by the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO in February of this year: "In the most recent period, some fighters have complained, either

by writing letters to this newspaper office or telling their families, that if they don't give presents they cannot get things done. Their visits to home, attendance in schools, study of skills, awards for meritorious service, change to volunteer status, admission into the party, and so forth should be handled in accordance to prescribed regulations. Now they must 'build bridges with tobacco and liquor' and 'pave the way with special products.' When some fighters enter the ranks they write letters to their families asking for tobacco and liquor to give as presents to the cadres." The report added: "This situation shows that the principle of commodity exchange has really made incursions into the relationship between officers and men in the companies." The cadres' prestige has been damaged, and the fighters' souls have been corrupted. The glorious image of our army among the masses of people has also been tarnished." (19) (LAD 21 February 1986 report) This not only is shown in the improper work style of cadres in "recruit coaching regiments," but also includes the improper work style of cadres of ordinary field units. The Chinese communists' army newspapers also said that the "recruit coaching regiments" exchanged the recruits' overcoats and pocketed the recruits' mess money and food coupons. Some of them without authorization make "local policies" under which at every turn they fine recruits to get money for themselves. Some of them directly approach the recruits to get them to spend money on buying things for the cadres. Some of them, without authorization, take the money sent to the recruits by their families. What kind of pattern will this kind of "coaching regiment" teach the recruits? No wonder that some recruits say with feeling: "It was truly a disappointment to find out that the units were like this." Some of them said: "Wait until I become a veteran squad leader. I'll treat recruits in the same way." (20) (LAD 22 February 1986 report) The true results of this reform by the communist army are obviously more on the negative side than the positive.

2. Establishment of a "combined arms tactical training center" to train in rotation and in a careful fashion the units of all "group armies." In April of this year, the Chinese communists announced to the outside world, "The first combined arms tactical training center has been established in the 'Nanjing Military Region.'" (21) (Central Radio Station 22 February 1986 broadcast) According to a report by the Chinese communists, "this training center is a comprehensive training base, and it is a new training base that opens up the way to adapt to the system after the field armies have been changed to group armies. The units of all group armies from now on will in turn receive operational training in it." (22) (Ibid (2)) This system-type training site will train units of all group armies, which have different establishments and equipment, and especially train "group armies" whose operational areas differ in terrain and weather and whose missions are different. The operational mode they will probably adopt in the future will not be completely identical, and the circumstances of their receiving training of the same pattern will make it difficult for them to meet actual requirements. This problem will certainly be discovered in their future training practice.

3. Concentrated training of flyers by the Air Force. According to an assertion by the Chinese communists, "the Air Force's first new flyer training division has formally begun training. This is also the first time that new flyers who have graduated from ordinary schools have received concentrated

training in one division. This is a big breakthrough in the Air Force's reform of its training system." (23) (Central Radio Station 16 June 1986 broadcast) Air Force personnel who have already graduated from the Chinese communists' flight schools should have completed their basic flight training, so why would they still have to undergo concentrated flight training of a centralized nature? Obviously, the reason is that the flight school training was not suited to the flight operations of various aircraft models with different performances. This report by the Chinese communists did not make it clear whether this "new flyer training division" gives training in only one aircraft model or in many. If the former is the case, the communist army will have to set up many "new flyer training divisions" to give separate training in flying all the different aircraft models. If the latter is the case, the situation will be similar to that of the Army's "recruit coaching regiment," and no matter what aircraft model it is, the new flyers will have to be trained in this "new flyer training division," so how would it be different in nature from a "flight school"? In this "breakthrough" in the training "reform" of the communist army's Air Force, there are bound to exist many problems. The substantive results in future training and the effect produced on the operational training of the original Air Force divisions (those divisions that were responsible for new flyer training)--this is a problem that the communist army did not consider when only seeking a "breakthrough."

4. Navy's first use of formation training in ocean-going navigation. For a long time the units of the Chinese communists' Navy have made operational training in offshore defense primary. There could be changes in their training topics, modes, and content, but their operational capability remained limited to the offshore range. According to a recent report by the Chinese communists, from the middle to the end of May, an ocean-going joint formation, composed of many service arms and many ships, of the "North Sea Fleet" carried out training in ocean-going coordinated operations in the northwest Pacific Ocean. The report said this was a "bold attempt." (24) (Chinese communists' Shanghai Radio Station 10 June 1986 broadcast, and Central Radio Station 21 June 1986 broadcast)

If this report by the Chinese communists is true, it shows that their Navy considers this to be a "breakthrough" in training reform. However, the "summation meeting" held by the "North Sea Fleet" after the event did not mention its degree of suitability for ocean-going operations and the defects that appeared. The fact that the Chinese communists publicly reported on this even to the outside world many times shows that the purpose of the ocean-going voyage was political propaganda and that the so-called "training reform" was secondary.

#### IV. Reform of the System of War Preparedness Mobilization

Because the communist army has "switched its idea of preparing for the contingency of an early and large-scale war to building the armed forces in a period of peace" and focuses its current work on "supporting "economic construction," there has appeared a sparse situation in its operational units' ideas and actions in preparedness against war. To make up for this defect, the communist army has taken a series of measures in its system of war preparedness mobilization, the specific practices of which include:



A. Formation of Reserve Duty Units. In May 1984, the Chinese communists' Second Session of the Sixth NPC passed a new "military service law," which proposed the establishment of a "system of combining militia and reserve duty."

Yang Dezhi, the Chinese communists' chief of staff, in a talk explaining the revision of the "military service law," clearly stated: "The purpose of combining militia and reserve duty and establishing a sound system for officers and noncommissioned reserve duty is to maintain fewer troops in peacetime and to dispatch more troops in wartime. This is a major strategic measure, and it is of major significance for both national defense construction and economic construction." However, in the past 2 years, the formation of reserve-duty units by all the provinces, cities, and prefectures has not been vigorous. After the "enlarged session of the Military Commission" in June of last year (1985), there were fairly many reports of such formations of reserve duty units, but up to now, the formation of reserve duty units in various parts of the mainland has not been comprehensive. Based on observation of the formation of a reserve-duty division in Zhuzhou City, Henan, (25) (Chinese communists' Hunan Radio Station 2 November 1986 broadcast) and the formation of a reserve duty regiment in Fengcheng County, Jianxi, (26) (Chinese communists' Jiangxi Radio Station 10 December 1985 broadcast) the Chinese communists are establishing division-level reserve duty units in cities and prefectures directly under the province, and establishing regiment-level reserve duty units in counties of cities and prefectures. The commander of Zhuzhou's Army reserve duty division is concurrently the commander of Zhuzhou Military Subdistrict, a fact which is sufficient to prove the military subordination of reserve duty units. In the Chinese communists' work of switching the county (city) people's armed forces departments to the local system of organization in the first half of this year, there has not yet been discovered any newly built reserve duty units. The "national forum on city militia," held in Peiping in May of this year, only discussed the leadership system, work methods, formation, and training of militia work, and did not bring up the question of combining it with reserve duty. (27) (XINHUA News Agency 21 May 1986 Peiping dispatch) This seems to show that there are obstacles to the formation of reserve duty units.

B. Giving Students Military Training. The provision to this effect was an important part of the newly revised "military service law" of 1984. Yang Dezhi, the communist army's chief of staff, has pointed out that the military training of students is an important aspect in strengthening the building of reserve forces. He also said: "The military training of students of institutions of higher education is divided into two types. One type is basic military training for the students in which they study general military skills and enhance their concept of national defense; the other type is the training of reserve officers to be a supplementary source of officers in wartime." This is sufficient to prove that the military training of students by the Chinese communists is an important measure for their war preparedness mobilization. In May of last year (1985), the Chinese communists' "Ministry of Education" and the communist army's "General Staff Department" and "General Political Department" held a "national work conference on student military training experimental points." The conferees decided that, beginning in

September 1985, 52 institutions of higher education and 102 senior middle schools on the mainland would be experimental-point units for military training and that military training would be a required course for the students. There are 13 subjects, including military thought, modern military science, training in firing light weapons, principles of platoon and company tactics, and wartime mobilization. (28) (XINHUA News Agency 29 May 1985 Peiping dispatch) In the second half of 1985, it was discovered that the institutions of higher education and the senior middle schools in various places were separately carrying out experimental-point work on military training. Up to April of this year, there were still reports of this type of military training experimental-point situations in various places. However, in many areas the communist army's "military region" there or its units stationed there send military cadres to teach the military subjects. Obviously, this is a divergence from the original intent of the provisions of the Chinese communists' "military service law." (Note: Article 44 of the Chinese communists' new "military service law" stipulates that the military training organizations of the institutions of higher education are to allocate military instructors and to organize and give military training to students. Article 45 stipulates that senior middle schools or equivalent schools are to allocate military instructors and give students military training.) This phenomenon is not because the work of schools at all levels in allocating military instructors has not been completed, but because the communist army is making use of this opportunity to get involved in the education and training in the schools. This is no different than the communist army's practice of the so-called "three supports and two militaries" during the "Cultural Revolution," when it exerted "military control and military training" on organizations and schools, but its implied substantive effects are still worth noting. In June of this year, it was discovered that in some areas the Communist army had organized the running of "summer camps" for middle school students (29) (Chinese communists' Zhejiang Radio Station 15 June 1986 broadcast and Central Radio Station 16 July 1986 broadcast), and this is obviously an action related to the communist army's involvement with student military training at all levels. With the schools' education and the students' life being subjected to control by units of the army stationed locally, the schools' normal education and their necessary extracurricular activities are bound to be adversely affected.

C. Reversion of the County (City) People's Armed Forces Departments to the Local System of Organization. The main mission of the Chinese communists' "people's armed forces departments" at all levels is military service and mobilization work. Currently, the so-called "building of national reserves" in the Chinese communists' promotion of "combining militia and reserve duty" is one of their principal duties. The Chinese communists have said: "The switching of people's armed forces departments to the local system of organization is a major reform in the system of people's armed forces work (30) (Chinese communists' Shandong Radio Station 23 May 1986 broadcast), "and it further strengthens the party's control over the armed forces, and builds closer relations between the relevant local departments and the people's armed forces departments." (31) (Chinese communists' Anhui Radio Station 25 May 1986 broadcast) It was also held that "this reform would be advantageous for strengthening the construction of national defense reserve force and for

promoting the development of economic construction." (32) (Chinese communists' Guangdong Radio Station 4 March 1986 broadcast)

In February of this year, the "CPC," "State Council," and "Central Military Commission" issued "Regulations on Relevant Questions After the Switchover of County (City) People's Armed Forces Departments to the Local System of Organization," which pointed out that "after the people's armed forces departments are switched to the local system of organization, the duties of their staff members in the local establishment will not change, and they will exercise dual leadership in the localities and the armed forces." It was stipulated that "the staff of people's armed forces departments are reserve officers of the army, and the wage standards and welfare treatment for the cadres and staff are set in accordance with the standards of local public security cadres and police and public security staff and with the regulations." With respect to their time for handing over and taking over, it was stipulated that "people's armed forces in the interior are to complete the transfer before the end of June 1986; with regard to people's armed forces departments or the first line of land or sea border defense, with the exception of those whose transfer is postponed, the transfer is to be completed before the beginning of 1986." (33) (XINHUA News Agency 8 February 1986 Peiping dispatch) According to reports, as of the end of June, with the exception of the Xinjiang region, all county (city) people's armed forces departments had completed their transfer to the localities according to plan. It was also said: "After the people's armed forces departments were switched to the localities, they became both military departments of the local 'party committee' at the same level and military service organizations of the 'people's government' at the same level. Focusing on the new situation of the change in system of organization for the people's armed forces departments, military departments at all levels have in succession run training classes for people's armed forces department cadres." (34) (XINHUA News Agency 6 July 1986 Peiping dispatch) Materials show that when the Chinese communists first drew up the plan for switching county (city) people's armed forces departments to the local system of organization, there were serious fluctuations in the thinking of the staffs of the people's armed forces departments. Most of them thought that the number of core members of the militia would be reduced, the training task would be cut down, and some weapons would be sealed up for safekeeping, and that it would be a case of "putting the weapons back in the arsenal and grazing the war horses on the hillside"--relaxing vigilance against war (35) (Ibid (32)). This sluggish idea appearing among the cadres of the people's armed forces departments, and the fact that many newly appointed cadres of people's armed forces departments would be new men, will certainly be detrimental to the promotion of overall war preparedness mobilization in the future. The Chinese communists' original desire, under the circumstances in which the idea of war preparedness was sparse in the operational units, was to make up this defect by "reforming" the war preparedness mobilization system, but it looks as if this idea of the Chinese communists will fail. The Chinese communists call on the localities to manage the cadres of the "people's armed forces departments" in line with the communist army's rules and regulations, something which is even more inconceivable. What is meant by the "party controlling the armed forces" is control of a policy nature, not administrative control. This idea of a "local government" managing a "people's armed forces department," which is a military



unit, by administrative means is bound to cause a situation in which the more control there is the more disorder there is: in the end the so-called "dual leadership" could turn into a situation of unmanned leadership, and the future work of the "people's armed forces departments" will be weakened, not strengthened.

#### V. Malpractices Derived From Logistics Reform

Although "reform" of the communist army's logistics has been promoted for many years, the results have not been outstanding. As Hong Xuezhi [3163 1331 2535], director of the communists army's "General Logistics Department," pointed out in 1984 in a special article published by the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO: The most fundamental reason that results have not been seen in the "reform" of the army's logistics is that there is no clear idea and theory about modern logistics to act as a guide, and there exist blindness and wilfulness. (36) (LAD 15 July 1984 report) In recent years the Chinese communists have promoted some measures for logistics "reform," but an analysis shows that there still exist many errors and malpractices.

A. Establishment of the General Logistics Department's Base Command Post: According to a report by the Chinese communists in October 1985: "Based on an order by the Central Military Commission, a Base Command Post of the communist army's General Logistics Department for the unified leadership and management of all the army's strategic rear area warehouses has been established in Wuhan." In a speech at the inaugural meeting, Hong Xuezhi, director of the communist army's "General Logistics Department," pointed out: "The establishment of the Base Command Post for unifying the leadership and management of all the strategic rear warehouses in the army is of important significance for implementing and stockpiling and supplying, at the three levels--strategic, campaign, and tactical; managing the system; improving logistics supply capabilities; and meeting the army's need for modernization, regularization, and a future war against aggression." He also said: "The principal missions of the Base Command Post and its subordinate bases and warehouses are, in peacetime, to manage well the strategic stockpiled materiel and to supply some units, in wartime, to provide logistic strategic support to all war zones." (37) (LAD 19 October 1985 report) In peacetime, the communist army's practice of graded, concentrated stockpiling and management of logistic materiel is fairly convenient. However, in wartime the concentrated stockpiling of strategic materiel has the defect of incurring destruction en masse. After the communist army deactivated the "Wuhan Military Region" and set up the Base Command Post of the General Logistics Department, it had in mind the idea of replacing strategic reserve forces with strategic materiel. Obviously, the mobility of strategic materiel is not as flexible as that of the armed forces, and if the stockpiles cannot be dispersed it will be fairly difficult to display the mobility for effective support of the emergency needs of all the war zones.

B. In the administration and control of production, there are still many oversights: In October 1984, at the same time that the "3d Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee" of the CPC decided to promote the "reform of the urban economic system," Deng Xiaoping called on the communist army's units to subordinate themselves to the overall situation in "economic construction" and

to vigorously support economic construction. With the slogan of supporting and serving "economic construction," the armed forces have engaged in business and trade activities in a big way, creating the strange phenomena of "neither being military nor commercial" and "military and commerce forming an organic whole." To correct this improper situation, the three general departments of the communist army in May 1985 formulated and issued "Provisional Regulations for the Armed Forces Engaged in Business and Foreign Trade." The regulations required that the communist army's units abide by the "policies, decrees, and discipline of the party, state, and the armed forces when engaging in production and business and in foreign trade. They also clearly point out those illegal businesses and trade activities that are strictly forbidden and those that are not permitted must not be done. (38) (LAD 16 May 1985 report) Afterward the business and profit-making activities of all organizations and units in the communist army went underground and ran rampant as before. A situation appeared in which "orders were not carried out and practices that were forbidden did not stop." In the armed forces this kind of disobedience is serious. In March of this year, the CPC's "Central Military Commission" decided to set up an "all-army leading group for the inspection of financial and economic discipline" with Hong Xuezhi, director of the "General Logistics Department" as the group's leader and Guo Linxiang [6753 2651 4382], deputy director of the department, as the group's deputy leader, which would inspect financial and economic discipline in the communist army. Hong Xuezhi said: "it will inspect and strengthen our army's logistic construction." (39) (XINHUA News Agency 11 March 1986 Peiping dispatch) At an "inspection report-back meeting" in June of this year, it was admitted that "some problems had been uncovered" and that the "area of involvement was wide." (40) (XINHUA News Agency 16 June 1986 Peiping dispatch) During its financial inspection, the "Lanzhou Military Region" deactivated or reformed 28 commercial companies. (41) (Chinese communists' Gansu Radio Station 21 July 1986 broadcast) Of the 23 companies run in it, the "Sichuan Provincial Military District" has deactivated 16 and is putting 7 in order. (42) (Chinese communists' Sichuan Radio Station 27 July 1986 broadcast) After a lot of "reform" measures in the communist army's logistics departments, there are still appearing this or that kind of error and malpractice, and the results of the "reforms" are not yet apparent.

C. Logistics warehouses put into practice "Reserve Duty Soldier" system: In March of this year, the communist army's "Base Command Post of the General Logistics Department" in Wuhan convened a meeting of "leaders" of the units in the logistics system at the regimental level and above to discuss questions concerning the putting into practice by warehouses of the "reserve duty soldier" system. According to the Chinese communists': "The putting into practice by warehouses of the 'reserve duty soldier' system was a strategic decision made by the CPC's 'Central Military Commission' to strengthen warehouse construction, and was also a major reform of the Army's cadre system in warehouses." (43) (Chinese communists' Hubei Radio Station 26 March 1986 broadcast) The reserve duty system put into practice for management personnel of the warehouses of the communist army's logistics departments changes their status from active duty to reserve duty, so that the number of active duty personnel in the communist army is reduced but the actual number of working personnel does not change. In this way the communist army's "streamlining and organization" creates a false impression in logistics departments, and it

could be said to be a deceptive trick that "steals the sky and puts up a sham sun"--perpetrates a gigantic fraud--in the Chinese communists' cut in the number of military personnel. The treatment, promotion and transfer, and prestige of personnel who have been changed from active duty status to reserve duty status will be different from those of personnel on active duty. It will certainly directly affect their work morale and be detrimental to the promotion of logistic supply work. In particular, it will increase the distance in the relationship between questions concerning logistics work personnel and active service personnel of the armed services, and should not be considered a wise practice that pays full attention to logistics work.

## VI. Comprehensive Comment and Analysis

A. Although "reform" work in the Chinese communist armed forces has been going on for many years its scale of promotion is just as Xiang Shouzhi [0686 1343 1807], commander of the Chinese communists' "Nanjing Military Region, " said at a "forum" after the "enlarged session of the Military Commission" of the CPC in June 1985: "The reform of the system, the streamlining and reorganization, and the cut of 1 million military personnel can be said to have opened a breach in reform." (44) (LAD 27 March 1986 report) This "breach" that was opened when Deng Xiaoping, while announcing the 1 million cut in military personnel, replaced the comrades of several "large military regions" and merged some "large military regions," and half of the 1 million military personnel which were cut were cadres of the communist army. Obviously, these military cadres who have been cut are certainly not what the Chinese communists call the "three types of people" (45) (The "three types of people" are: 1) those who thrived by rebelling and closely following the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing gangs; 2) those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas; and 3) those who beat, smashed, and looted during the Cultural Revolution.), but they are bound to be anti-Dengist figures who oppose and impede "reform." On the pretext of carrying on "traditions" and affirming past "experience," toward all "reforms" if they were not slow in reacting they waited and looked on with an indifferent attitude. In recent years, after the gradual removal of this type of military cadre, the pace of "reform" has advanced. However, from an observation of the "reform" measures recently promoted, one can only say that they are still more form than substance. In the communist army units, no specific results in raising the tangible combat power can yet be seen.

B. The "reform" of the Chinese communists' armed forces is part of their overall "reform." However, the armed forces' strategic and tactical thought is inappropriate, and their system of establishment and equipment is inadequate to meet the needs of modern warfare, a situation that is the exciting cause impelling the communist army to take the path of "reform." At the same time, conservative, outworn military viewpoints are blocking the development of all "reform" measures in the communist army. However, the communist army is intensifying its research on military academic ideas in recognition of the fact that on the battlefield of the future "information, electronics, and space will be dominant," and it is beginning to take steps in the direction of "automation" in its operational command system. Understanding that the characteristics of modern offensive operations are to be "large in depth and high in three dimensions," the communist army has

widened the frontage of the operational zones in its "large military regions" and is expanding in the direction of making them large in depth. It is also stressing the formation of combined arms "group armies" in an effort to display the comprehensive combat power of all its service arms. It is also striving to coordinate academy education and unit training, which shows that, in course of their "reform" of the armed forces, the Chinese communists are drawing up plans in the two aspects of changing their guiding idea for strategy and elevating their tangible military power. Although at present the specific results have not been marked, developments in the future are worth serious attention.

C. When promoting the activities of "military training in schools," the Chinese communists do not, according to regulations, have military instructors in the schools do this work, but rather send military cadres from the units stationed in the locale to the schools to give the training. The armed forces also directly arrange "summer camp" activities for school students, similar to the "military control" and "military training" during the "three supports and two militaries" practiced by the communist army during the "Cultural Revolution." In comprehensively supporting the Chinese communists' activities in "economic construction," the communist army in the rural areas is supporting the various types of the production responsibility system among the peasants; and in the cities, important places, and important areas, it is supporting various types of engineering and communications construction. In the rural areas, factories and mines, residential districts, stores, and schools "army-people joint building" activities are again being launched, both "supporting industry" and "supporting agriculture." It also supports the "reform faction." All of this makes it hard to strictly distinguish this practice from the practice of the "three supports and two militaries" during the "Cultural Revolution," which Deng Xiaoping once severely criticized. Under the circumstances in which the Chinese communists exercise centralized rule, the communist army at any period must play a critical role, but the people on the mainland are not satisfied with this. Now, the people in some areas feel that the communist army has "added to the trouble" of the localities, and there exists the idea of "casting off the burden," (46) (XINHUA News Agency 23 July 1986 Changsha dispatch) which worsens "army-government" and "army-people" relations. The "army cherishes the people" and "people support the army" activities, which the Chinese communists regularly promote, in fact reflect a relationship between the one and the other of "not cherishing" and "not supporting."

D. The Chinese communists do not admit that the current corruption in the "party style," "army style," and "social mood" is caused by the "reforms," (47) (RENMIN RIBAO 7 July 1986 Yu Qiuli's speech at "report-back meeting on correction of party style and party consolidation throughout the army.") mainly out of fear that the communist cadres and the people on the mainland will lose faith in "reform." However, data prove that currently the many instances of graft, corruption, and crimes on the mainland are directly connected to the "reforms." Especially in the armed forces' business and profit seeking there is a serious situation of practicing fraud and deception so that "orders are not carried out and prohibited practices are not stopped." Admittedly there are many background factors in this situation, but the direct cause still stems from the "reforms." Because of "the streamlining and

reorganization and the reform of the system," the number of military personnel has been cut. There widely exists among the communist army's cadres an unease about the passive mood in the unit's work. Because there also exists an unease among the "leading" cadres at the regiment level and above in the communist army about the lack of "revolutionary" dedication in the units' work, the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO has set forth the demand that the "branches not move." The general idea of this article in the newspaper is that the unstable morale of basic-level cadres is a case of the "leaves moving" and that the unease of the "leading" cadres at the regiment level and above is a case of the "branches moving." (48) (LAD 20 May 1986 report) In fact, the "roots" of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought were shaken long ago, and the "movement" of "the trunk and the branches" was inevitable. Of course, this is not something that one demand by the communist army can change.

## VII. Conclusion

Since the "enlarged session of the Central Military Commission" of the CPC in June 1985, although the Chinese communists have accelerated the pace of "reforms" in the armed forces and have done some work in this respect, with the communist army being used to the habits and characteristics of "reporting only good, not bad news and practicing fraud and deception," corrupt practices run wild in reform work. In particular, the Chinese communists are stressing that the present time is a "peaceful period of building the armed forces," and that the communist army follows and serves the overall situation in "economic construction." With the creation of few ideas about war preparedness in the communist army, the mood of any cadres to leave the armed forces has grown, already seriously affecting the effective promotion of all "reform" measures in the Chinese communists' armed forces. The biggest problem is that, in this "reform" the Chinese communists cannot come up with a systematic theory of military strategy to act as a guide. This especially increases the obstructions and tortuousness in the course of "reform." Therefore, even if the Chinese communists have put forward several reforms for the armed forces and have carried them out with an intense publicity campaign, the probability of their success is doubtful.

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CSO: 4005/942

## MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

FRENCH NAVAL COMMANDER FETED--Heijing, September 21 (XINHUA)--Commander of the Navy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Liu Huaqing gave a dinner here this evening in honor of Admiral Yves Leenhardt, chief of staff of the French Navy. Leenhardt is the first French navy chief to come to visit China since the diplomatic relations were established between the People's Republic of China and France in 1964. He arrived here yesterday. Liu paid a visit to France last year. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1331 GMT 21 Sep 86 OW] /12624

RADAR ANTI-JAMMING TECHNOLOGY--Beijing 18 Sep (XINHUA)--A Chinese air force unit has developed "abridged frequency conversion technology" which will help radar to improve its range and performance, and allow more resistance to interference. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1039 GMT 18 Sep 86 OW] /12624

CSO: 4000/020

TAIWAN

KMT TOLERATES NONPARTISAN STREET ACTIVITIES

OW171006 Taipei CHINA POST in English 14 Sep 86 p 8

[Excerpt] The ruling Kuomintang is earnest in resuming talks with nonpartisans as manifested by its tolerance of the latter's street activities lately, the Chinese-language UNITED DAILY NEWS reported yesterday.

Security officials had suggested taking countermeasures to stop the non-partisans from taking to the streets further, but the proposal was turned down by the policy making authorities of the KMT, the paper said.

As Taiwan is under martial law, speeches and street activities not sanctioned by authorities are considered illegal and security officials can crack down on them.

After the dialogue is renewed, the KMT is willing to broaden the scope of the talks to include resolving the problem of the Tangwai Research Association for Public Policies (TRAPP), constitutional problems, etc., the paper said.

Meanwhile, KMT dignitaries yesterday visited nonpartisan legislator Fei Hsi-ping to look into possibilities of resuming the talks, which have been deadlocked since June.

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CSO: 4000/008



## BA YI ON KUOMINTANG REUNIFICATION CONDITIONS

OW091121 (Clandestine) Ba Yi Radio in Mandarin to China 1215 GMT 6 Sep 86

[Text] Chiang Ching-kuo and other Kuomintang chieftains have set six conditions for the reunification of China, which are extremely preposterous and absolutely unacceptable. For example, they want to put six provinces in east China under Kuomintang control after national reunification. As everyone knows, these six provinces are our country's richest and economically most developed provinces. According to our country's new plans, the east China economic zone will play a most important role in the country's modernization. If these six provinces were separated from the country as an economic entity, our plans for socialist construction might end in failure.

In addition, the Kuomintang calls for ensuring free competition between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party throughout the country. However, historical experience shows that the Kuomintang's reactionary chieftains have for decades tried in every possible way to kill all communists and establish one-party rule throughout the country. Harboring unrealistic ideas, many of them are still carrying on their anticommunist struggle under the banner of free Kuomintang-Communist competition, in an attempt to overthrow communist political power and rebuild Kuomintang political power.

Now, let us take a look at another one of their conditions, namely, that military leaders should not interfere in political matters. The purpose behind this is obvious to everybody. The Kuomintang reactionaries harbor a profound hostility to our Liberation Army. Under the party's leadership, our army smashed several million Kuomintang troops armed to the teeth by U.S. imperialism. All our commanders and fighters ardently love and firmly defend the motherland and are ready to die in defense of the achievements of the revolution and the socialist and communist cause. The PLA has long been ready in full battle array to resolutely hit back at the Kuomintang reactionaries and U.S. imperialists and at all their schemes and conspiracies against our country. This treacherous proposal that military leaders should not interfere in political matters is aimed at undermining our party-army and army-people unity.

Now, let us look at still another condition set by the Kuomintang chieftains. They call for recognizing the flag that depicts the blue sky and white sun as



national flag of China. This is another ridiculous condition. Please stop and think: The Five-Starred Red Flag has been flying over the motherland, the PRC, for the past 37 years. This flag was dyed red by the blood of the several million fighters who died for the victory of the people's revolution. One billion Chinese people are closely united under this red flag. How can we agree to replace our Five-Starred Red Flag with the Kuomintang flag of the blue sky and white sun?

In setting the six ridiculous conditions for the reunification of the country, Chinag Ching-Kuo and the other Kuomintang chieftains undoubtedly harbor the most sinister schemes. Instigated by U.S. imperialism, they put forward these conditions in an attempt to sabotage again the peaceful reunification of China.

Our stand on the question of reunifying China is clear-cut. Comrade Deng Xiaoping recently pointed out again: We want to settle the Taiwan issue through negotiation. However, our patience is limited. If the Kuomintang refuses to reunify the motherland by peaceful means, then we will have to liberate Taiwan by force.

These remarks by Comrade Deng Xiaoping express the aspirations of the entire army and people throughout the country. The six ridiculous conditions put forward by the Kuomintang chieftains for the reunification of China are absolutely unacceptable to the entire army and people across the country.

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TAIWAN

BRIEFS

REGRETS ON TYPHOON DEATHS--Beijing, 1 Sep (XINHUA)--The All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots here sent a cable today to the Taiwan Red-Cross Society, expressing condolences to Taiwan compatriots devastated by Typhoon Wayne on 22 August. "The news that dozens of people died, several hundred were injured and serious damage done to property by Typhoon Wayne has given us immense sadness. We wish to express our deep sympathy to the victims and we hope that they can soon rebuild their homes and lives," said the cable. [Text]  
[Beijing XINHUA in English 0930 GMT 01 Sep 86 OW] /9738

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'NEGATIVE' ASPECTS FOR HONG KONG'S FUTURE DISCUSSED

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[Article by He Li [0149 4539]: "Hong Kong's Prospects: Increase in Negative Factors"]

[Excerpts] Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration officially went into effect in June 1985, Hong Kong's future political structure and the basic law have been discussed for over a year. Now China's official intention has become clearer, and the Hong Kong people's political enthusiasm has generally cooled. China's nuclear power station project in Daya Bay adjacent to Hong Kong has evoked a surging antinuclear tide in Hong Kong in recent months since the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Soviet Union, but the Chinese authorities have no intention of reconsidering the Daya Bay project. The 1997 shadow plus the nuclear shadow have made many people feel more pessimistic about Hong Kong's future.

I have heard a story from my friends in journalistic circles: Some people talked with a senior official of the Hong Kong Government, asking him to enumerate some optimistic factors for Hong Kong's future, but that senior official could not mention anything significant. The only thing which can be regarded as an optimistic factor is that both China and Britain have agreed to arrange an independent membership for Hong Kong in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The Waning of Political Enthusiasm

The issue of Hong Kong's future has given rise to the establishment of many organizations which intend to comment on political affairs and participate in political activities. There are political organizations of people from the grassroots level and intellectuals from the middle class, and there are also political organizations composed of professionals and management personnel at the upper level who are close to the government establishment. Some people even tried to found political parties for a time. At one period, Hong Kong, which was apolitical for a long time, was suddenly sent into a political fever. However, as the Chinese authorities have more clearly shown their intention concerning Hong Kong's future political arrangements, the political fever among Hong Kong people has begun to cool down.

First, some political groups composed of the social elite, who are closely associated with the upper level and the capitalists have changed their course. A few years ago, when China put forward the slogan of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong," a group of outstanding professionals expressed their doubts and they said that it would not be possible to practice "Hong Kong people's self-government." After the joint declaration was published, they began to believe that the joint declaration would ensure that the future Hong Kong Government would be composed of "local inhabitants" and practice "a high degree of autonomy." So they tried to organize political parties. Their enthusiasm vanished after the Chinese authorities indicated that they do not want to see any "major changes" in Hong Kong's government system, and their plan to organize a political party of the elite was also abortive. They explained their reason for giving up the plan to organize a political party by saying that Hong Kong is not an independent country and there could not be any political party under China's sovereignty.

Second, the political organizations, which are composed of the intellectuals from the grassroots level and the middle class who are rather active in discussing the basic law and the future government system, recently have also become tired of the political activities. Some opinion groups which are loosely formed have ceased to exist except in name, and many of their members have quit. Only a few major organizations can still maintain cohesion among their members and continue some activities, but they have also stopped holding the forums and seminars which are their main form of activity. People have become lukewarm about the joint meetings of the opinion groups for the purpose of forming alliances, carrying out cooperation, or exchanging opinions, and fewer people and groups now attend such meetings. With regard to this phenomenon, some people in political circles explained that this is because there have been no incidents in the recent period to stimulate political activities, no such opportunities as elections and mass movements for the activists to attend, some political activists have entered the government establishment, and most organizations recently directed their attention to the case of calling for the suspension of the Daya Bay nuclear power station project. In addition, they have long made public their political opinions and have nothing new to add. The mass media have also become tired of reporting their opinions. Above all, an important reason is that their high expectations for the "historical opportunity" brought about by the 1997 issue have encountered a strong rebuff from the Chinese authorities and the social groups which have vested interests in Hong Kong who hate to see any change in the establishment, so even if they lower their expectations, they still find that they can hardly succeed in anything.

On the other hand, the general public in Hong Kong is obviously unconcerned with the basic law and the future political structure. The rows and discords in the drafting and consultation of the basic law have given rise to "lethargy" among many Hong Kong people. hind-the-scenes manipulation of the Chinese authorities in the preparation and establishment of the consultative committee of the basic law has greatly dampened people's confidence in China's promise of allowing "Hong Kong people to govern Hong Kong." Not long after the consultative committee began to work, quite a few members of the committee

felt dispirited and could not really do what they wanted to do. Only after the basic law drafting committee held its second meeting in Beijing this April were the members of the consultative committee able to read the draft about the structure of the basic law, and before that, they had merely to wait for Beijing's arrangements and had no chance to express their opinions. As for the group meetings, especially the meetings of the group for the future government system, they were merely free and fruitless discussions, and a place for idle talk. Now, only one-third or one-half of the consultative committee members attend the group meetings, which are held twice a month. Because there is merely idle talk at such meetings, the meetings cannot sum up any general opinions or opinions of the majority. In the consultative committee, there are different opinions on the selection of the chief executive of the future government and on the forming of the future legislature, but the consultative committee will not decide anything through voting as the committee's constitution stipulates, and various opinions will only be recorded in the meeting minutes which do not reflect the proportion of members agreeing with an opinion. So some people are worried that this will merely enable the Chinese authorities to adopt the opinions they like.

#### The Chinese Authorities Make Their Attitude Clear

Last year, on the issue concerning the development of the government system in Hong Kong's transition period, the Chinese authorities instructed Xu Jiataun, director of the XINHUA Hong Kong Branch, to denounce "some people's violation of the book," and this finally forced the British side to agree that the development of Hong Kong's government system must be dovetailed with the basic law. In the activities of the basic law drafting and consultative committees, Beijing has made its intentions clear. The intentions of the Chinese authorities on Hong Kong's future government system can be summarized into the following points: first, in the transition period before 1997, there can only be some minor changes and must not be any major changes in Hong Kong's government system, and reform of the government system must be subject to the basic law. Second, China does not want to see the organization of political parties among Hong Kong people themselves, and does not want to see Hong Kong people bargaining with Beijing in an organized way. Third, China does not want to see a political structure of democratic representative government replacing Hong Kong's existing political structure of colonial government, does not want to see too many members of the future legislature being elected directly by the public, and does not want to see a chief executive elected by any form of open and general election. Fourth, China hopes that Hong Kong's future political structure will be centered on an executive chief who takes orders from Beijing, and does not want to see a ministerial system. So China explains the point that "the executive authorities should be accountable to the legislature" in the joint declaration in its own way.

In addition, the central authorities in Beijing have also laid down other rules and regulations over the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. First, Hong Kong cannot even have any "residual power" over affairs which are not related to defense and foreign affairs, and all power which has not been specified should fall into the hands of the central authorities. Second, the drafting

of the basic law for Hong Kong cannot affect China's Constitution, and the Constitution will not be revised and nothing will be added to it because of the basic law in Hong Kong; Hong Kong's basic law cannot indicate the invalidity of the Constitution or any articles of the Constitution in Hong Kong. Third, freedom of speech and freedom of the press in Hong Kong must not violate China's sovereignty.

The senior officials in charge of Hong Kong affairs in Beijing repeatedly explained and stressed the above-mentioned points of the Chinese authorities, and issued various warnings to Hong Kong. The Beijing officials said that the term "accountable" in the statement that "the executive authorities should be accountable to the legislature" means "having the responsibility for making explanations, exposition, and consultation." Later, Li Hou, deputy director of the State Council Office for Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, said that China does not want to see a chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region who merely has a title and does not have real power. According to Li Hou, the relationship between the future administration and legislature should be: the administration should report its work to the legislature and reply to inquiries raised by the legislature; the legislature has power to approve financial budget [words indistinct] the financial reports submitted by the administration; the legislature also has power to impeach any senior administrative official who has broken the law and request the central government to handle the case. As far as the matter of political parties is concerned, Li Hou said in Shenzhen in May that the only regulation that can be made is to forbid the organization of political parties in Hong Kong, and he also warned that if parties are founded in Hong Kong after 1997, it is "hard to say" whether the Communist Party will also carry out open activities. Not long after that, Lu Ping, secretary general of the State Council Office for Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, also said that there should be no party politics in Hong Kong, because it would make the situation too complicated and too chaotic. Lu Ping also had reservations on direct elections because it might unavoidably give rise to party politics, and he did not agree with the ministerial system either because it is not in line with the joint declaration and may give rise to political parties too. Like Li Hou, Lu Ping also mentioned the question of enacting a law to forbid political parties.

Now, the officials from Beijing are singing the same tune, and Lu Ping also said that Li Hou's explanation of the term "accountable" was based on the "common understanding" between China and Britain. However, this has given people the impression that the Chinese authorities explain the articles of the joint declaration as they like. At the same time, China has announced that the premium income from land transactions in Hong Kong in the account of the future Special Administrative Region will be used to make investments. Some people regard this move as a violation of the joint declaration, because the joint declaration stipulates that the premium income should be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and should not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong. However, the Beijing official said that entrusting banks to invest this money does not go against the spirit of the joint declaration, because merely depositing the money with banks to earn interest will not be an effective way to maintain the value of this fund. So a land fund investment committee was then established.

## The Conservative Tendency Holds Sway

As China restricts the reform of Hong Kong's political structure, the local antireform force is also acting tenaciously. People in the upper class and in the business and industrial circles, who have vested interests in the existing establishment, are trying hard to resist the efforts of people at the grassroots level to share their power and hold that the further opening of the government to people's participation will inevitably lead to the rise of the faction which advocates "free lunch."

Former secretary of finance John Bremridge once gave a prudent warning to those "stubborn politicians" who intend to slowly advance representative government. Hong Kong Bank chairman Sandberg (the biggest and most influential banker in Hong Kong who held a position in the Executive Council for 8 years) openly said not long ago that a small handful of politicians are seeking fame rather than caring about Hong Kong's future and they are merely newsmakers who do harm to Hong Kong. Sandberg also held that the public's pressure on the government merely comes from some small pressure groups and seldom comes from the majority of the public. At the same time, some members of the Executive Council warned that the pursuit of representative government must be very prudent and no drastic changes should be brought about, and some other members insist that members of the Executive Council must be appointed, and one of the reasons for this is that they must keep government secrets. They also said that the government system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should not be too far different from the existing one.

The business circles' resistance to an open government system also finds expression in the basic law consultative committee. Many consultative committee members from the business circles hold that most members of the future legislature should be elected indirectly rather than directly, and some people even insist that a certain proportion be appointed members. They also oppose the appointment of a chief executive by means of general election and oppose the forming of a large electoral college; instead, they hold that the chief executive should just be nominated and elected by a small number of people. Obviously, these people have learned from the message passed through China's official channels that the Chinese authorities do not want to see too many changes in Hong Kong's government system, so they think that it is better to go along with the Chinese authorities.

As a result, the "democratic faction" in the consultative committee is in a disadvantageous position. Recently some 50 members of the consultative committee put forward a proposal for a future government system which will "have very few changes." They proposed that half of the seats in the legislature be held by the people elected by the functional constituencies and the other half of the seats be held by people elected by the electoral college and elected directly by the public. On the other hand, they proposed that the chief executive be elected by another electoral college.



The pro-China organs and opinions in Hong Kong have expressed appreciation of those remarks which agree that the fewer changes in the government system the better. They even hold that the remarks of the people at the upper level of the government establishment show that Britain's approach to representative government is getting closer to the government system of the future Special Administrative Region. According to the pro-China organs, the statements of Li Hou and Lu Ping showed Beijing's hand. They also go all out to advocate that the future government system in Hong Kong must be "led" by the executive authorities and that directly elected members of the legislature should not account for too large a percentage.

According to the white paper on representative government, the Hong Kong Government will study the issue of direct elections when it reviews the development of the government system next year, and may begin to hold direct elections in 1988. Most opinion groups agree that direct elections should be held at an earlier date, but the conservative forces have many reservations on direct elections. The pro-China organs have even said that the review of the government system should be postponed to 1989, and fiercely attacked the elected members of the Legislative Council who advocated "resisting communism by means of democracy." A government official once said that the force which demands direct elections is not strong enough. Some people are also worried that the review next year will not be a substantial one but may be a final one, because it is not worthwhile for the "lame duck" government to "flatly defy" China, and everything can be arranged in light of the basic law. At the same time, people may also expect that as the conservative force holds sway now, it will play a greater role in Hong Kong's political arena.

#### The Shock of the Nuclear Power Plant Project

After the nuclear disaster occurred, which could "only happen once in 10,000 years," Hong Kong people became seriously worried about the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station project, fearing that if an accident happened at that power plant, Hong Kong would suffer unimaginable consequences. In recent months, the issue concerning the Daya Bay nuclear power plant has been tainted with more and more political color, and the opposing opinions on this issue have become more and more antagonistic. On the one hand, there is a surging antinuclear tide among residents in Hong Kong; on the other hand, the Chinese authorities are resolved to push ahead with the nuclear power plant.

The movement to stop the Daya Bay Nuclear Power project collected more than 1 million signatures, and representatives of more than 100 organizations participating in this antinuclear movement also went to Beijing to present a petition, but Beijing continues on its established course. Hong Kong people are not only worried about the safety of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power project on technological grounds, but are also worried about China's system for operating and managing this nuclear power plant. At the same time, they fear that the nuclear power plant may shake people's confidence in the practice of "one country, two systems," because any slight trouble at Daya Bay or any nuclear accidents in other countries may trigger a crisis of confidence in Hong Kong, which could upset people and drain human and financial resources, thus affecting the implementation of "one country, two systems."



However, the Chinese authorities did not make the slightest concession to the antinuclear demands of the Hong Kong public, and instead launched a propaganda counteroffensive. They repeatedly stressed the high level of safety of the nuclear power project and denounced the antinuclear opinions as "irrational." In China's propaganda offensive, people noted that the weekly LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION declared in its column "Letter from Beijing" that the Chinese Government's policy for developing the nuclear power industry will never change (and this certainly applies to the Daya Bay project), and it also quoted an "authoritative person" by saying that the rumor about China's reconsideration of the Daya Bay project is absolutely groundless. People have also noted that an article carried by TA KUNG PAO was published in the form of a booklet entitled "Should the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station Be Built?" It explains that China will resolutely develop the nuclear power industry; the Daya Bay Nuclear Power station will be very safe; China will properly manage the nuclear power plant; and the Chinese Government does attach importance to the wishes of the public.

In the controversies over the nuclear power project, some people in Hong Kong proceed purely from the angle of technology and hold that the nuclear power plant will be very safe; but others make political speculation by opposing the antinuclear movement. Some backbone elements of the bloc which opposes the antinuclear movement are politicians who have even advocated democratization in Hong Kong.

The antagonism over the nuclear issue has fiercely shaken people's feelings. Some people hold that Hong Kong people's antinuclear movement is a test of the Chinese authorities' sincerity for respecting the wishes of the public and for implementing "one country, two systems," and the Chinese authorities' persistence in building the Daya Bay nuclear power plant just shows that they only want to save face and do not allow public opinion to affect their rule and authoritative position. The Chinese authorities' position of not stopping the project, not moving the construction site, and not postponing the project has made many people in Hong Kong and overseas resentful. Some people working with pro-China institutions even said angrily that if China insists on building the Daya Bay nuclear power station and defies the people's wishes, China will have no bright future, because these people are a group of Hong Kong residents who have the least opportunity to emigrate to other countries.

#### The Hidden Perils in the Social, Political, and Economic Fields

In view of the dim political future, many people who have the opportunity to emigrate have been making preparations to seek a way out for themselves. Emigration is a constant focus of social attention. Any shocking event in Hong Kong can prompt a new group of people to make up their minds to emigrate to other countries. The dim political future has also brought a mentality of seeking monetary ease and of facing the end of the world to many people in Hong Kong.

In the economic field, the increasing uncertainty of the political future has highlighted the tendencies of an outflow of funds and diversifying of investment. In the past 1 to 2 years, China has poured in funds to rescue many big companies, and quite a few of these business failures were related to people's pessimistic views on Hong Kong's future. For investors, the years around 1990 will be a crucial psychological period, and there will be a crisis of confidence. Hong Kong's economy will also face a stern test. People who want to diversify the arrangement of their wealth and prepare a way out must complete these things before 1990. Some corporations are now selling their stocks and assets, and this may also be related to the need to prepare a way out. As a senior official who knows much about Hong Kong's economic tendencies said, the expected returns of investment are proportionate to the risks of investment; the greater the risks are, the greater the expected returns should be. The closer it is to 1997, the greater the uncertainty about the political future will be, so the greater risks investment will face. Then, even if people are still investing, they will be more anxious to reap staggering returns. Thus, this will be a major hidden peril in Hong Kong's future economy.

Now, there are fewer than 11 years before 1997. Although the countdown to 1997 is moving toward the end, the sun still rises from the east every day as always, and the people still have a long way to go. It will never be easy to go this way, because we are in fact pushing a cart of stones uphill.

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